Criminal Law NEWS

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PUBLISHED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SECTION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR FOR ITS MEMBERS

Criminal Law Section Board Elected to Lead Section in 2011-2012

Front Row, seated (l to r): Lisa K. Caruso, Vice Chair; Casey R. Stevens, Chair; Carolyn V. Grady, Immediate Past Chair; Reno S. Harp III, Ex Officio.
Back Row, standing (l to r): Andrea L. Moseley, Judge Charles S. Sharp, Colette Wallace McEachin, Judge Michael E. McGinty, Theo K. Stamos, Judge Ashley K. Tunner, Judge Ivan D. Davis, Linda Duggan Curtis, Robert G. Morecock.

New Board Members

Judge Ivan D. Davis was born and raised in Hampton, Virginia. He graduated from the University of Virginia in 1984 with a B.A. in American Government, and from Howard University School of Law in 1987. He worked at the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1987-1990; practiced corporate healthcare at King and Spalding from 1990-1992; was a solo practitioner from 1992-1994; joined the United States Air Force as an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate in 1994. He served as an Assistant Federal Public Defender for the Central District of Illinois, and as First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eastern District of Virginia. Selected as United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of Virginia, in June 2008.

Gene Fishel currently serves as Senior Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Computer Crime Section where he directs prosecutions of child exploitation, computer fraud and identity theft cases in state courts across Virginia. He also serves as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in both the Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia where he prosecutes computer crime cases in federal court. He also drafts legislation for the Virginia General Assembly, trains law enforcement and prosecutors statewide, and educates the public on issues involving computer crimes. He received his J.D. from Wake Forest University and his BA, Magna Cum Laude, from James Madison University.

Colette Wallace McEachin is Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, and is responsible for supervising the five General District and Traffic Courts in the City. She received her undergraduate degree from Brown University and her law degree from the University of Virginia. After practicing with civil firms in Atlanta and Richmond, she joined the Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney. She focuses on the prosecution of violent felonies and oversees the Community Prosecution program for the City. She is a member of the Hill- Tucker Bar Association and the Richmond Criminal Bar Association.

Judge Michael E. McGinty was born and raised in Philadelphia, Pa. He received his B.A. from Saint Joseph's University in 1982 and his J.D. from William and Mary in 1985. He served on active duty for four years in the Navy JAG Corps, was an assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for Williamsburg/James City County from 1991-1997 and served as Commonwealth's Attorney from 1997-2007. He was appointed to the General District Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit in 2007. Married with three children.

Robert G. Morecock is a graduate of Washington and Lee, receiving his B.A. (Magna Cum Laude) in 1975, and his J. D. in 1978. He specializes in Criminal Trial Practice and Personal Injury litigation with the firm of Shuttleworth Ruloff Swain Haddad & Morecock in Virginia Beach. He was admitted to the Virginia Bar in 1979 and is listed in "Best lawyers in America."

Theo K. Stamos is the Chief Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney for Arlington County and the City of Falls Church. She joined the office in 1987 as an assistant commonwealth's attorney and was promoted to chief deputy in 2003. Ms. Stamos has prosecuted thousands of cases including capital murder, child sexual assault and other violent crimes. She received her law degree from American University where she attended night school while working as a reporter at several news outlets, including *The Washington Times*. A native of Chicago, Ms. Stamos received her undergraduate degree from Northern Illinois University. She resides in Arlington, Va. with her husband, Craig Esherick and sons, Nicholas and Zachary.

MEMBER RESOURCES AREA
http://www.vsb.org/site/sections/criminal/

ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTERS FOR SECTION MEMBERS

Receive your newsletters electronically. Visit the VSB's website at https://member.vsb.org/vsbportal/ to verify or change your email address of record. Newsletters also available online for section members only, using: Username: criminallawmember; Password: P7CVRWk1

This site is available only to Section members

Chair's Column

Letter from the Chair
Casey R. Stevens

I am honored to serve as the 2011-2012 Chair of the Virginia State Bar's Section on Criminal Law. I have been privileged to serve on the Board since 2007 and look forward to another productive year addressing the work of the Section on behalf of the Bar.

Historically, the Section was organized in 1967 specifically to concern itself with the problems of crime, criminology, and the administration of criminal law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, except those subjects specifically excluded by direction of the President of the Virginia State Bar. There is no other organization in Virginia that is so broadly representative of prosecutors, defense counsel, trial judges, and academics concerned with the criminal justice system in the state. The Section's Board of Governors includes prosecutors, defense attorneys, a Circuit Court judge, a General District Court Judge, a Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judge, a U.S. Magistrate Judge, as well as a representative of the Virginia Attorney General, and a U.S. Attorney. The diversity on the board has been effective in speaking with one voice for the improvement of criminal justice in Virginia.

We on the Board ask for the insight of each of the members of the Section to assist in carrying out our stated mission. Please do not hesitate to contact me directly or any member of the Board of Governors with questions, concerns, or suggestions that you may have which will assist us in furthering our purpose.

Presently, the Board is preparing for the Section's Annual Criminal Law Seminar to be held February 3, 2012 in Williamsburg and February 10, 2012 in Charlottesville. The planning process for the seminar began in May and our Vice Chair and Seminar Program Chair, Lisa K. Caruso, and your Board of Governors have put together a most informative program which I trust each of you will want to attend. Should the 3rd or 10th of February be unavailable to you, there will be several video replays following the live presentations. I encourage each of you to make an effort to attend a live presentation as being in the presence of so many who practice our craft is inspiring. As an additional incentive to attend a live presentation, MCLE has advised that a new regulation will go into effect during the compliance year beginning November 1, 2011 which will limit the number of hours to eight (8) for pre-recorded programs, including the videotape replays.

As of July 2011, the membership of the Criminal Law Section stands at 2382 including 323 judicial members. We are pleased to welcome our new Board members: Judge Ivan D. Davis of the United States District Court in Alexandria; Samuel E. Fishel, IV, Chief of the Computer Crimes Section of the Office of the Attorney General serving as Attorney General Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II's designee; Judge Michael E. McGinty, of the 9th Judicial District General District Court; Robert G Morecock, of Shuttleworth, Ruloff, Swain, Haddad, and Morecock P.C. of Virginia Beach; Theo K. Stamos, Chief Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney for Arlington County and the City of Falls Church; and Colette Wallace McEachen, Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond. I am grateful for the time and expertise that they and all of our Board members devote to the business of our Section.

It is with sadness and appreciation that we thank the retiring members of the Board, whose terms ended, June 30, 2011: David J. Damico of Roanoke, Jeffrey A. Swartz of Norfolk, Richard E. Trodden of Arlington, Judge Dennis W. Dohnal of Richmond, and Judge James S. Yoffy of Henrico. It has been a true pleasure to serve with each of these distinguished professionals.

Carolyn V. Grady retires as Chair but will continue to serve on the Board as the Immediate Past Chair. To Carrie we extend our thanks and appreciation for her outstanding leadership this past year.

As has been custom, I would like to focus the members of our Section on a quotation which I find most inspiring in directing my thinking while engaged in the necessary clash between the Government, the accused and sometimes the Court, "Justice has

nothing to do with what goes on in a courtroom; Justice is what comes out of a courtroom" – Clarence Darrow. Let us commit ourselves to achieving justice.

U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE DECISIONS

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011). The Court dismissed a suit against former Attorney General Ashcroft for allegedly authorizing "the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of [suspected terrorists] whom the Government has no intention of using at trial." The Court held (1) qualified immunity applied because no "clearly established right" was violated at the time of the challenged conduct; (2) Fourth Amendment reasonableness "is predominantly an objective inquiry," thus actual motivations do not matter. The Court noted that actual motivation is relevant in only two limited exceptions – special need and administrative-search cases.

Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011). "The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable…." In this case police followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment when they smelled marijuana outside the door. When police knocked on the door, they heard noises consistent with the destruction of evidence. They then kicked down the door, entered, and found drugs in plain view. The Court held that police, like any citizen, may knock at a door. Thus although the threatened destruction of evidence was in response to police conduct, such conduct was not unlawful. "Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed." [The Court withheld judgment on a situation where police threaten entry without any legally sound basis for a warrantless entry].

Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011). "When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply." At the time the search was conducted, it was lawful under New York v. Belton. But while the case was on appeal, Arizona v. Gant overturned Belton.

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011). The case involved interrogation of a 13-year-old seventh-grade student. Whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is an objective determination involving two discrete inquires:" first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." So long as the child's age was known to the officer, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, including age in the custody analysis is consistent with the Miranda test's objective nature.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011). "The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification…." The State may not substitute the in-court testimony of a scientist familiar with the testing procedure, but who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification.

Turner v. Rodgers, S.Ct. (6/20). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not govern civil contempt cases, and Due Process does not always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened. Determining whether a right to counsel is required, requires consideration of opposing interests and the probable value of "additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Neither counsel nor sufficient alternative procedures were afforded to this defendant who was incarcerated for refusal to pay child support.

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE DECISIONS

U.S. v. Digiovanni, F.3d (4th Cir. 7/25/11) In justifying a stop and frisk, many of the facts relied upon by the officer "border on the absurd." For example, the officer labeled two shirts hanging in the back of the car as "suspicious," because "non-drug traffickers would pack the shirts in a clothing bag."

U.S. v. Massenburg, F.3d (4th Cir 5/13/11). The concept of collective-knowledge, also known as the "police team" or "fellow officer" doctrine "holds that when an officer acts on an instruction from another officer, the act is justified if the instructing officer had sufficient information to justify taking such action herself; in this very limited sense, the instructing officer's knowledge is imputed to the acting officer." However, this doctrine does not permit courts "to aggregate bits and pieces of information from among myriad officers, nor does it apply outside the context of communicated alerts or instructions." [emphasis added].

U.S. v. Poole, F.3d (5/17). A trial judge's possible error in making reference during a bench trial to the unadmitted guilty pleas of co-defendants, is subject to harmless error review.

U.S. v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566 (4th cir. 2011). In the absence of objection by the defendant, when the judge continues polling the jury after a lack of unanimity is revealed "reversible error occurs only when it is apparent that the judge coerced the jurors into prematurely rendering a decision, and not merely because the judge continued to poll the jury."

VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE DECISIONS

Hicks v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 353, 706 S.E.2d 339 (2011). The Court found adequate probable cause for issuance of a search warrant when the officer "observed several individuals enter the home at different times, each exiting within 30 seconds, and one of the individuals had money in his hand. The reliable confidential informant spoke with a woman who had just exited the home, and she referred to the home as a 'Dope House.' [The officer] also saw the woman open a folded piece of paper to show the informant what she stated was heroin she had just purchased inside the home."

Howard v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 455, 706 S.E.2d 885 (2011). A court-initiated continuance "is subject to the same requirements regarding objections as other continuances." The defendant's failure to object to the continuance initiated by the trial court resulted in tolling the speedy trial statute.

Walker v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 227, 704 S.E.2d 124 (2011). The "blue book" listing of the value of an automobile is "created for the administration of affairs generally and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial." Therefore the blue book was not testimonial in character and its admission did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation.

Crawford v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 84, 704 S.E.2d 107 (2011). "Despite the fact that the immediate purpose of the affidavit was to obtain a protective order in a civil case, the facts recited were, nonetheless, "potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Thus the affidavit was testimonial, and its admission into evidence violated the confrontation clause. (but harmless error, and conviction upheld).

Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, S.E.2d (2011). "Unlike a crime laboratory testing for narcotics or DNA, there are any number of typically non-prosecutorial reasons to test urine and vaginal discharge, such as for infections arising from both consensual sexual and nonsexual exposure to pathogens. Thus, under these circumstances, a laboratory technician would not have reason to believe or suspect that the results of his or her testing would be used in a later trial." Accordingly, the lab report was not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz.

Kelso v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 134, 710 S.E.2d 470 (2011). Code s18.2-255(A)(ii) prohibits causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party. The marijuana was supplied in Henrico County but distributed in Hanover County. "Therefore venue in Hanover County was proper in this case."
Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011). Three life sentences imposed on a juvenile did not violate Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) because "Code s53.1-40.01 provides for the conditional release of prisoners who have reached a certain age and served a certain length of imprisonment thus complying with" Graham's requirement that the juvenile must be provided with "some realistic opportunity to obtain release." [Court also held that failure to comply with the statutory parental notification requirements does not constitute a denial of due process.

Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 705 S.E.2d 503 (2011). While defendants "may have suffered ineffective assistance of counsel according to Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) and may have been successful had they timely filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus …, neither did so. Ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an error of fact for the purposes of coram vobis under Code s8.01-677." The Court also held that "the writ of audita querela is not available to seek post-conviction relief from criminal sentences in Virginia."

Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 23, 704 S.E.2d 406 (2011). A timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be granted when the court determines that the motion is "being made in good faith and is premised upon a reasonable basis that the defendant can present substantive, and not merely dilatory or formal, defenses to the charges."

Startin v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 374, 706 S.E. 873 (2011) "Code s18.2-53.1 has dual objectives. First, the statute criminalizes the use or display of an actual firearm that has the capability of expelling a projectile by explosion, including 'any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm.' Second, the statute also has the additional purpose of preventing fear of physical harm by the use of threatening display of an instrumentality that has the appearance of having the capability of an actual firearm."

Rowland v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 396, 707 S.E.2d 331 (2011). The Court reversed a conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a burglary because the burglary was complete before the use or display of a firearm. "Once a perpetrator enters at nighttime, with or without breaking, with the requisite intent, the crime of burglary is complete. Although the perpetrator remains criminally responsible for any illegal acts performed after the burglary, the crime of burglary does not continue until the perpetrator vacates the premises."

Ellis v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 499, 706 S.E. 2d 849 (2011) "To sustain a conviction under Code s18.2-279, the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant had the specific intent to shoot at or against a particular building. Rather, the evidence need only show that a defendant who unlawfully discharges a firearm knew or should have known that an occupied building or buildings were in his line of fire."

Courtney v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 363, 706 S.E.2d 344 (2011) Defendant's statement "'I have a gun,' and that he would 'have to kill' or 'shoot' the victim if she continued to disregard his commands, combined with his opportunity to discard an actual firearm, were sufficient to find him guilty of use or display of a firearm in the commission of a felony under Code s18.2-53.1." [Even though only a toy gun was actually found in the vicinity of the crime].

Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 396, 707 S.E.2d 331 (2011). Conviction of animal cruelty upheld because "at the very least

the [trial] court could properly conclude that the horse was in such a condition during a period of 30 to 48 hours before its death that emergency veterinary care was immediately necessary to alleviate suffering, during which time no such treatment was provided."

VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE DECISIONS

Morris v. City of Va. Beach, 58 Va. App. 173, 707 S.E.2d 479 (2011). The police "observed a trailer load exceeding the 8 foot, 6 inch maximum width prescribed by Code s46.2-1109. By itself, this observation established a prima facie violation of the statute. Despite the hypothesis (which later turned out to be false) that the truck driver, Morris, might have obtained a special permit authorizing him to exceed the statutory maximum with his 12-foot-4-inch wide load, [the officer] had the legal right to stop Morris and briefly investigate to determine whether the requisite permit had in fact been issued.

Flanagan v. Commonwealth, Va. App. , S.E.2d (8/30/11). "Code s18.2-85 [possession or manufacturing of explosives] does not require that the Commonwealth show that an individual possessed a malicious intent in possessing or manufacturing the explosive devices. In effect, Code s18.2-85 establishes a strict liability offense that an accused may counter with the statutory affirmative defenses provided in the last clause of the statute."

Burrell v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 417, 710 S.E.2d 509 (2011). "Nothing in Miranda or its progeny prohibits the police from continuing to question a suspect when the suspect makes a qualified request for counsel, to the extent permitted by the qualification…. The qualification must also be unequivocal and unambiguous and thereby make it clear to a reasonable police officer what kinds of questions the suspect is unwilling to answer."

Henderson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 363, 710 S.E.2d 482 (2011). Case of first impression addressing the "good cause" exception to the right to confrontation applicable at probation revocation hearings. The Court held that in non-trial proceedings involving an accused's liberty interest, the Commonwealth is required "to explain and justify its failure to provide confrontation before considering the evidentiary admissibility of any testimonial hearsay."

Isaac v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 255, 708 S.E.2d 435 (2011). "Under Virginia law, a litigant waives an objection to evidence when he introduces 'evidence dealing with the same subject as part of his own case-in-chief.'" In this case, defendant introduced into evidence a 0.14% BAC certificate of analysis. This evidence dealt with the same subject as the Commonwealth's 0.16 BAC certificate.

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 435, 710 S.E.2d 518 (2011). Trial courts have "no authority – constitutional, common law, of statutory – to acquit" defendants after finding the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 709 S.E.2d 175 (2011). "Convictions for malicious wounding under Code s18.2-51 and maiming under Code s18.2-41 do not violate the prohibition on double jeopardy." The Court also held that "the fact that the men may have originally assembled … for a lawful purpose … does not preclude the possibility that the group later developed into a mob."

Burton v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 274, 708 S.E.2d 444 (2011). "Valuation of currency, with its representative value denominated upon its face, or as here, by its color and size, is fundamentally different than valuation of any other item. By its nature, currency's valuation is not subject to injudicious estimation." Thus testimony was admissible and adequate to establish value when the witness "described the number and size of the containers, the type of coins that were housed in each, and how full each jar had been prior to the theft." Marshall v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 211, 708 S.E.2d 253 (2011). Code s18.2-472.1(B), knowing failure to register as a sex offender, "is not a specific intent law." The term "knowingly" merely requires "proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."

Simon v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 194, 708 S.E.2d 245 (2011). "Although every exposure made with lascivious intent in violation of Code s18.2-370(A)(1) may also be an intentionally obscene exposure in violation of Code s18.2-387, the converse is not true because the obscenity element of indecent exposure is broader than the mere lascivious desire for 'sexual indulgence.'" Thus indecent exposure is not lesser included in indecent liberties.

Barson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 451, 711 S.E.2d 220 (2011) en banc. Code s18.2-152.7:1 prohibits using a computer to harass any person by communicating "obscene" language. Previous cases had distinguished offensive and coarse language from obscene language that focused on sexuality. The Court overruled prior interpretations and held that obscene language encompasses that which is "disgusting to the senses … offensive or revolting."

Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 339, 709 S.E.2d 711 (2011). Code s18.2-60 criminalizes threats contained in "electronically transmitted communications producing a visual or electronic message." Defendant violated the statute by posting his threat on a public website [MySpace] "available for everyone to view." "It is of no consequence that appellant did not direct [victim] to view his MySpace profile.

CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

HARRY L. CARRICO PROFESSIONALISM AWARD

VSB Section on Criminal Law

The Harry L. Carrico Professionalism Award was established in 1991 by the Section on Criminal Law of the Virginia State Bar to recognize an individual (judge, defense attorney, prosecutor, clerk, or other citizen) who has made a singular and unique contribution to the improvement of the criminal justice system in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The award is made in honor of the Honorable Harry L. Carrico, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, who exemplifies the highest ideals and aspirations of professionalism in the administration of justice in Virginia. Chief Justice Carrico was the first recipient of the award, which was instituted at the 22nd Annual Criminal Law Seminar in February 1992.

Although the award will only be made from time to time at the discretion of the Board of Governors of the Criminal Law Section, the Board will invite nominations annually. Nominations will be reviewed by a selection committee consisting of former chairs of the section and Chief Justice Carrico.

Prior Recipients

The Honorable Harry L. Carrico	1992	Craig S. Cooley, Esquire	2002
James C. Roberts, Esquire	1993	Prof. Robert E. Shepherd	2003
Oliver W. Hill, Esquire	1995	Richard Brydges, Esquire	2004
The Honorable Robert F. Horan	1996	Overton P. Pollard, Esquire	2005
Reno S. Harp III, Esquire	1997	The Honorable Paul B. Ebert	2006
The Honorable Richard H. Poff	1998	Rodney G. Leffler	2007
The Honorable Dennis W. Dohnal	1999	Prof. Ronald J. Bacigal	2008
The Honorable Paul F. Sheridan	2000	The Honorable Jere M.H. Willis Jr.	2010
The Honorable Donald H. Kent	2001		

Criteria

The award will recognize an individual who meets the following criteria:

◆ Demonstrates a deep commitment and dedication to the highest ideals of professionalism in the practice of law and the administration of justice in the Commonwealth of Virginia;

◆ Has made a singular and unique contribution to the improvement of the criminal justice system in Virginia, emphasizing professionalism as the basic tenet in the administration of justice;

◆ Represents dedication to excellence in the profession and "performs with competence and ability and conducts himself/herself with unquestionable integrity, with consummate fairness and courtesy, and with an abiding sense of responsibility." (Remarks of Chief Justice Carrico, December 1990, Course on Professionalism.)

Submission of Nomination

Please submit your nomination on the form below, describing specifically the manner in which your nominee meets the criteria established for the award. If you prefer, nominations may be made by letter.

Nominations should be addressed to Casey R. Stevens, Chair, Criminal Law Section, and mailed to the Virginia State Bar Office: Eighth and Main Building, Suite 1500, 707 East Main Street, Richmond, VA 23219. **Nominations must be received no later than December 2, 2011.** Please be sure to include your name and the full name, address, and phone number of the nominee.

If you have questions about the nomination process, please call Elizabeth L. Keller, Assistant Executive Director for Bar Services, Virginia State Bar, at (804) 775-0516.

HARRY L. CARRICO PROFESSIONALISM AWARD

NOMINATION FORM

Please complete this form and return it to the Virginia State Bar, Eighth and Main Building, Suite 1500, 707 East Main Street, Richmond, VA 23219. **Nominations must be received no later than December 2, 2011.**

Name of Nominee: _____

Profession: _____

Employer/Firm/Affiliation: _____

Address of Nominee: _____

_____

_____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Name of person making nomination _____ Telephone _____
(Please print)

E-mail _____ Signature _____

(Please attach an additional sheet explaining how the nominee meets the criteria for the Harry L. Carrico Professionalism Award.)

Criminal Law NEWS

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