

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

IN THE MATTER OF
JOHN WILLIAM TRIPP

CASE NO. CL18-2672
VSB DOCKET NOS. 16-022-103341, 16-022-105230,
17-022-106582 and 17-022-109733

AGREED DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM ORDER
FOR A SUSPENSION WITH TERMS

This matter came to be heard on Friday, September 07, 2018, before a Circuit Court Three-Judge panel, upon the joint request of the parties for the Court to accept the Agreed Disposition endorsed by the parties and offered to the Court as provided by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The panel consisted of the Honorable William R. Marchant, Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Designated Chief Judge, the Honorable Kimberley S. White, Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, and the Honorable Pamela S. Baskervill, Retired Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. John William Tripp was present and was represented by counsel, Paul D. Georgiadis. The Virginia State Bar appeared through its Assistant Bar Counsel, Paulo E. Franco, Jr. The Chief Judge polled the members of the panel as to whether any of them were aware of any personal or financial interest or bias which would preclude any of them from fairly hearing the matter to which each judge responded in the negative. Court Reporter Jennifer L. Hairfield, Chandler and Halasz, P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, Virginia 23227, telephone (804) 730-1222, after being duly sworn, reported the hearing and transcribed the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, upon consideration of the Agreed Disposition, Certification, Respondent's answer and demand, Respondent's disciplinary record, the arguments of the parties, evidence in mitigation, and after due deliberation,

In light of concerns expressed by the Court, counsel for the bar, with the agreement of Respondent and his counsel modified the Agreed Disposition to reflect a change in the terms requirement, to-wit; the Respondent will be required to complete eight hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) in Ethics, rather than four hours of law office management.

It is therefore **ORDERED** that the Circuit Court accepts the Agreed Disposition and the Respondent shall receive a Six-month Suspension with Terms for VSB Docket Nos. 16-022-103341, 16-022-105230 and 17-022-109733, and VSB Docket No. 17-022-106582 is dismissed with prejudice, as set forth in the Agreed Disposition, which is attached and incorporated in this Memorandum Order.

It is further **ORDERED** that the sanction is effective September 12, 2018.

The Respondent must comply with the requirements of Part Six, § IV, ¶ 13-29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Respondent shall forthwith give notice by certified mail of the Suspension of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, to all clients for whom he is currently handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and presiding Judges in pending litigation. The Respondent shall also make appropriate arrangements for the disposition of matters then in his care in conformity with the wishes of his clients. The Respondent shall give such notice within 14 days of the effective date of the Suspension, and make such arrangements as are required herein within 45 days of the effective date of the

Suspension. The Respondent shall also furnish proof to the Bar within 60 days of the effective day of the Suspension that such notices have been timely given and such arrangements made for the disposition of matters.


It is further ORDERED that if the Respondent is not handling any client matters on the effective date of the Suspension, he shall submit an affidavit to that effect within 60 days of the effective date of the Suspension to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System at the Virginia State Bar. All issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and arrangements required by Paragraph 13-29 shall be determined by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, which may impose a sanction of Revocation or additional Suspension for failure to comply with the requirements of this subparagraph.

The Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess costs pursuant to §13-9 E. of the Rules.

A copy teste of this Order shall be mailed, to the Respondent, John William Tripp, at his last address of record with the Virginia State Bar, 468 Investors Place, Suite 202, Virginia Beach, VA 23452, with an attested copy to Paul D. Georgiadis, Law Office of Paul D. Georgiadis, PLC, 2819 N. Parham Rd., Suite 110, Richmond, VA 23294-4425, and to Paulo E. Franco, Jr., Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, 1111 East Main Street, Suite 700, Richmond, Virginia 23219-0026, and to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System, Virginia State Bar, 1111 East Main Street, Suite 700, Richmond, VA 23219-0026.

ENTERED THIS 10 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2018

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'William R. Marchant', is written over a horizontal line.

William R. Marchant, Chief Judge
Three-Judge Circuit Court

RECEIVED
Sep 5, 2018

VIRGINIA STATE BAR
CLERK'S OFFICE

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

VIRGINIA STATE BAR EX REL
SECOND DISTRICT COMMITTEE
VSB Docket No. 16-022-103341, et al

v.

Case No. CL18-2672

JOHN WILLIAM TRIPP

AGREED DISPOSITION
(SUSPENSION WITH TERMS)

Pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-6.H., the Virginia State Bar, by Paulo E. Franco, Jr., Assistant Bar Counsel and John William Tripp, Respondent, and Paul D. Georgiadis, Respondent's counsel, hereby enter into the following Agreed Disposition arising out of the referenced matter.

VSB Docket No. 16-022-103341
Complainant: Tripp (Self Report)

I. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar.
2. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Virginia on April 28, 1988.
3. At all times relevant, Respondent was a member of Tidewater Legal Group ("TLG") and engaged in the practice of, among other things, representing debtors in bankruptcy court.
4. Frederic Juarbe, Jr. ("Juarbe") retained Respondent and TLG to represent his interests in filing a Chapter 13 Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
5. Juarbe entered into a fee agreement with TLG. The fee agreement was entered into pursuant to Local Rule of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 2016-1(C), a privilege which allows debtor's counsel to charge a flat fee of \$5,000.00.

6. Pursuant to the privilege, a debtor's firm is entitled to the flat fee and must provide all customary and necessary services and may not seek additional charges from the client without court approval.

7. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 Plan with the Court on behalf of Juarbe ("Plan").

8. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the Plan on the grounds that the TLG Fee Agreement violated the local rules of court and on other grounds.

9. Specifically, the Trustee objected to the fee agreement on the grounds that it violated Local Rule 2016-1(C), and further because it contained an impermissible clause limiting TLG's malpractice liability in violation of Rule 1.8(h) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.

10. The Court held a hearing on June 23, 2015, on the Trustee's objection.

11. After hearing evidence and argument, the Court entered an order on July 1, 2015.

12. The Court found that Respondent and TLG had impermissibly unbundled legal services to the client and charged additional fees for services that were required to be provided as part of the flat fee under Local Rule 2016-1(C).

13. The Court also found that exculpation provision in TLG's fee agreement violated Rule 1.8(h) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.

14. The Court also found that the case raised serious questions about Respondent and TLG's competence, diligence, and ethics required to practice before it.

15. Based on those findings, the Court sustained the Trustee's objection to Juarbe's Plan.

16. In the course of investigating this case, the Chapter 13 Trustee advised the Virginia State Bar's Investigator that the unbundling of services that Respondent engaged in was one of the worst cases he had ever seen.

17. The Court suspended TLG's privileges to charge a flat fee pursuant to Local Rule 2016-1(C) and further ordered Respondent and other members of TLG to take certain remedial actions before the Court would reconsider reinstating the privileges.

18. The Court also ordered TLG to self-report the violation of Rule 1.8(h) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct pursuant to Rule 8.3.

19. On July 14, 2015, Respondent, by counsel, complied with the Court's order regarding self-reporting to the Virginia State Bar.

20. Respondent's violation of the Local Rule 2016-1(C) and the Court's ruling demonstrate that Respondent did not have the necessary legal knowledge and skill to represent clients before the bankruptcy court.

21. Respondent would proffer in mitigation that prior to the hearing of June 25, 2015 when the Chapter 13 Trustee appeared on the Trustee's objections and prior to the court making findings on July 1, 2015, Respondent revised his fee agreement. In doing so, Respondent brought the agreement fully in compliance with the Court's Rules and with the Virginia Rules of Professional Responsibility

22. Respondent further proffers that he has now relinquished his admission and privileges to practice before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and therefore will no longer engage in a bankruptcy practice. Bankruptcy work constituted the overwhelming majority of Respondent's practice.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

Such conduct by Respondent constitutes misconduct in violation of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.1 Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

* * * *

RULE 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(d) Knowingly disobey or advise a client to disregard a standing rule or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but the lawyer may take steps, in good faith, to test the validity of such rule or ruling.

* * * *

RULE 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions

(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice, except that a lawyer may make such an agreement with a client of which the lawyer is an employee as long as the client is independently represented in making the agreement.

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VSB Docket No. 16-022-105230
Complainant: James Girvan Muncie, Jr.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar.
2. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Virginia on April 28, 1988.
3. At all times relevant, Kenneth Miller was a police officer with the City of Virginia Beach police force.
4. Officer Miller was injured by a third party tortfeasor while directing traffic as a part time employee for an asphalt company.
5. Officer Miller had filed a workers' compensation claim on his own.
6. Respondent states that Officer Miller retained him for representation with respect to a claim for personal injuries and not in connection with the claims under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.
7. Respondent further states that Officer Miller provided him with a copy of an initial denial of the workers' compensation claim dated January 30, 2013.
8. Respondent then entered into negotiations with the insurance carrier for the third party tortfeasor, Erie Insurance.
9. Respondent ultimately settled with Erie Insurance for \$52,500.00.
10. Respondent received a settlement check from Erie for the settlement amount.
11. Respondent kept a fee of \$17,000.00 and disbursed the balance to Officer Miller by way of a check in the amount of \$35,500.00, which he disbursed on January 28, 2014.
12. Respondent alleges he had no knowledge of the workers' compensation lien asserted by the workers' compensation carrier for the asphalt company.
13. The Virginia State Bar alleges that prior to negotiating the settlement check and making the distributions in the foregoing paragraphs, Respondent undertook no action at all to determine the status of the underlying workers' compensation claim, whether one had been paid and whether there were any outstanding liens to be honored. Respondent maintains he had not

knowledge because his client failed to advise him of the status of the workers compensation claim proceedings.

14. The workers' compensation carrier for the asphalt company had in fact paid a claim to Officer Miller and had asserted a lien against the proceeds of any settlement between Officer Miller and third parties.

15. When the carrier for the asphalt company learned that Officer Miller had entered into a settlement with Erie, the carrier for the third party tortfeasor, it contacted Respondent with a request for information in September 2014.

16. The workers' compensation carrier advised Respondent of its assertion of a lien and further advised Respondent that unless he provided the information and honored the lien, the carrier would initiate suit against both him and his client.

17. The carrier tried on several occasions to obtain this information both by writing and calling Respondent.

18. Respondent replied to the workers' compensation carrier with a letter dated November 12, 2014, stating that he would not provide any information with regard to the payment and distribution of the Erie funds, and he further requested that the workers' compensation carrier stop contacting Respondent.

19. The workers' compensation carrier ultimately filed suit against Respondent and Officer Miller to recover the lien it had over the settlement proceeds with the third party tortfeasor.

20. According to the process server hired by counsel for the workers' compensation carrier, Respondent denied who he was when he attempted to serve Respondent with the lawsuit.

21. Respondent failed to answer the suit that the workers' compensation carrier filed, and the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach entered a default judgment against Respondent.

22. Respondent retained counsel who sought to have the default judgment set aside.

23. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied Respondent's motion to set aside the default judgment.

24. At the hearing, the Court made the following statement:

What I recall of the facts in this case is that Mr. Tripp did everything that he could possibly do to thwart and otherwise frustrate Mr. Trumbull's attempts to get his attention to the point where, when he finally did get served, he denied to the process server that he was John Tripp.

25. Respondent and his client ultimately settled the lawsuit that the workers' compensation carrier filed against them by paying monies to settle and compromise the liens.

26. Respondent would proffer that he had no actual notice of the worker's compensation lien until after the worker's compensation award was entered on August 7, 2014, some eight (8) months after the personal injury case was settled and proceeds were disbursed. Respondent further proffers that in fact when he made formal inquiry to his client's employer—prior to settling the personal injury case, as to whether there was worker's compensation insurance for this accident, the employer responded on September 20, 2013, "none." Respondent would have contended that his client suffered no harm as the client was obligated to pay the lien amount from the personal injury settlement, that the client had the benefit of such funds for over 8 months, and ultimately paid less than the lien amount as respondent paid an equal share from his own funds, earned in the personal injury case.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

Such conduct by Respondent constitutes misconduct in violation of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.1 Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

* * * *

RULE 1.15 Safekeeping Property

(b) Specific Duties. A lawyer shall:

(5) not disburse funds or use property of a client or third party without their consent or convert funds or property of a client or third party, except as directed by a tribunal.

* * * *

RULE 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(j) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

* * * *

VSB Docket No. 17-022-109733
Complainant: Andrea Tembreull

I. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar.
2. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Virginia on April 28, 1988.
3. George Kaseote is a retired officer from the United States Navy who was in his 80s and is currently suffering from Alzheimer's disease.
4. Respondent alleges that at the time of his interactions with Mr. Kaseote, he believed him to be competent and aware of his actions.
5. Complainant is Mr. Kaseote's daughter.
6. After Mr. Kaseote's first wife passed away, Mr. Kaseote married a woman named Mary Compton.
7. Mary Compton introduced Kaseote to AS one of her friends or AS AN associate, an individual by the name of John Gatchell.
8. Respondent had previously known Gatchell and would later represent his interests in a bankruptcy matter while also representing Mr. Kaseote.
9. Gatchell was at all times relevant a convicted felon, and Respondent was aware of that conviction at some point during his representation of Mr. Kaseote.
10. During the course of the Virginia State Bar's investigation of this matter, Mr. Kaseote acknowledged that he believed Ms. Compton married him for money and that he was comfortable with this arrangement.
11. Gatchell brought Mr. Kaseote to Respondent so that Respondent would pay Mr. Kaseote's monthly expenses.
12. Respondent had Mr. Kaseote execute two retainer agreements dated April 19, 2016, and June 18, 2016, each for a fee of \$2,000.00 to write checks to cover Mr. Kaseote's daily expenses.

13. Respondent received \$21,754.97 on May 17, 2016, funds which belonged to Mr. Kaseote.

14. Respondent subsequently received a payment of \$21,657.67 on June 20, 2016 and another payment of \$20,269.92 on August 19, 2016 of funds that belonged to Mr. Kaseote.

15. Respondent maintains that at no time was he acting as a conservator or guardian for Mr. Kaseote.

16. Despite Respondent maintaining that he was not acting as a conservator or guardian, he stood in a fiduciary relationship with respect to the funds that were entrusted to him.

17. Respondent failed to pay Mr. Kaseote's expenses in a timely fashion, including his mortgage and other utility bills, which led to foreclosure actions and disconnect notices.

18. The foreclosure and disconnects were left to Complainant to resolve.

19. An examination of Respondent's trust account shows that he was making payments to third parties that were suspicious in nature, and should have put Respondent reasonably on notice to confirm directly with Mr. Kaseote that the payments were legitimate.

20. By way of example and not limitation, Respondent made the following payments

a. Live Nation - \$3740 on June 1, 2016 and \$3,760 on June 28

b. Rosenthal Jaguar - \$2,500 on June 6, 2016

c. Target - \$1,967.00 on June 23, 2016

d. John Gatchell - \$534 on June 30, 2016

e. John Gatchell - \$1,000 on July 7, 2016

f. John Gatchell - \$500 on July 20, 2016

g. Kristy Cox - \$250 on July 22, 2016

h. Kristy Cox - \$1,500 on September 12, 2016

i. Avalon Management - \$3,240 on September 12, 2016

j. Kristy Cox - \$317 on September 15, 2016

k. John Gatchell - \$526.75 on September 15, 2016

l. Avalon Management \$2,311 on September 15, 2016

21. Respondent claims that he verified the payments through the receipt of email requests from a Gmail account purportedly associated with Mr. Kaseote, but never called or never spoke in person with Mr. Kaseote to confirm the validity of the payments or the validity of the email account.

22. In the course of investigating these matters, the Virginia State Bar spoke with one of Respondent's former employees in connection with the Shelton matter.

23. That former employee, Tamala Olszewski, believed that she was being questioned in regard to several suspicious payments that Respondent made to a person that turned out to be John Gatchell.

24. Moreover, several of the checks drawn up by Respondent were dated before the date of the emails purportedly authorizing Respondent to make the payments.

25. Respondent never bothered to call Mr. Kaseote and verify if Mr. Kaseote had actually requested payments to third party lending companies or Live Nation, which sells tickets to rock concert and other events.

26. During the time that Respondent was writing checks to cover Mr. Kaseote's expenses, Respondent agreed to represent Mr. Kaseote on a reckless driving charge in Virginia Beach.

27. Respondent failed to attend the hearing, believing that the matter was continued, and Mr. Kaseote was found guilty of reckless driving in absentia.

28. Despite his client being tried in absentia with neither his client nor Respondent being present for trial, Respondent charged him an appearance fee of \$750.00 on May 17, 2016, and \$500.00 on June 23, 2016. Respondent did move for and appeared on a subsequent motion to reopen, which motion was denied.

29. In total, Respondent paid out from Mr. Kaseote's funds more than \$54,000.00, the majority of which did not go towards paying Mr. Kaseote's monthly living expenses.

30. Upon information and belief, Gatchell used the majority of the funds that Respondent disbursed, purportedly at the instruction of Mr. Kaseote, for Gatchell's own personal gain.

31. Due to the suspicious nature of the payments being made and the fact that Respondent was not acting as a conservator or guardian, Respondent knew or should have known to take steps in having one appointed to protect his client's interests.

32. Despite Respondent's claims that he saw nothing out of the ordinary, his legal assistant was suspicious of the very activity that Respondent claimed was ordinary.

33. During the course of this investigation, the Virginia State Bar was made aware by law enforcement officials investigating Mr. Gatchell and Ms. Compton's conduct that they did not uncover any evidence of criminal activity on the part of Respondent.

34. Respondent proffers that at the commencement of the representation, George Kaseote was competent to handle his business affairs and provided a cogent reason for retaining Respondent -- that he wished to shelter his property from his wife, a drug addict and a prostitute. Respondent further would have contended that he acted only in response to direct instructions from Mr. Kaseote. Respondent would further proffer that if the emailed instructions were sent by someone posing as George Kaseote, a contention the Virginia State Bar has argued but for which Respondent alleges it has no direct proof, that the spoofing of the Kaseote email account with a different suffix is a common and successful hack which has befallen even the most sophisticated of law firms. Finally, Respondent would have contended that at no time has the Virginia State Bar provided clear and convincing proof of any wrongdoing by Respondent.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

Such conduct by Respondent constitutes misconduct in violation of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.1 Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

* * * *

RULE 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

* * * *

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

* * * *

RULE 1.5 Fees

(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

* * * *

RULE 1.14 Client With Impairment

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

* * * *

RULE 1.15 Safekeeping Property

(b) Specific Duties. A lawyer shall:

(5) not disburse funds or use property of a client or third party without their consent or convert funds or property of a client or third party, except as directed by a tribunal.

* * * *

VSB Docket No. 17-022-106582
Complainant: Chiara Dawn Shelton

1. The parties have stipulated that in light of the holdings of Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1883, that there is not sufficient clear and convincing evidence for the Virginia State Bar to proceed forward on this case.

2. As a result, the parties have agreed to a dismissal of VSB Docket No. 17-022-106582 with prejudice.

PROPOSED DISPOSITION

Accordingly, Assistant Bar Counsel and the Respondent tender to the Disciplinary Board for its approval the agreed disposition of **SUSPENSION** for a period of **SIX MONTHS** with terms, as representing an appropriate sanction if this matter were to be heard through an evidentiary hearing by a panel of the Disciplinary Board. **THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR AND THE RESPONDENT JOINTLY MOVE THE COURT FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION OF SEPTEMBER 12, 2018.**

The terms with which the Respondent must comply are as follows:

1. Within Six Months of the date of the Court's disposition, the Respondent shall complete four (4) additional hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) in Law Office Management approved by the Virginia State Bar.

2. The four (4) hours of CLE identified in paragraph 1 above shall not count towards Respondent's CLE requirements as a member of the Virginia State Bar.

3. Within 30 days of completing any course(s) to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1 above, Respondent shall file his certificate of attendance with the Virginia State Bar's MCLE Department indicating that the hours are part of sanction determination and shall not count towards his MCLE requirements, and shall copy the office of Bar Counsel on such correspondence.

Upon satisfactory proof that such terms and conditions have been met, this matter shall be closed. If, however, all the terms and conditions are not met by the deadlines imposed above, the Respondent agrees that the Disciplinary Board shall impose an additional 6 month suspension pursuant to Rules of Court, Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13-18.O.

If the Agreed Disposition is approved, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess an administrative fee.

THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

By: _____
Paulo E. Franco, Jr., Assistant Bar Counsel

John W. Tripp, Respondent

Paul D. Georgiadis, Respondent's Counsel

If the Agreed Disposition is approved, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess an administrative fee.

THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

By: 
Paulo E. Franco, Jr., Assistant Bar Counsel


John W. Tripp, Respondent


Paul D. Georgiadis, Respondent's Counsel