VIRGINIA:

IN THE MATTER OF

PAUL CORNELIUS BLAND

VSB Docket Nos.: 99-031-0907

99-031-0921

99-031-1708

00-031-2092

00-031-3456

This matter came on April 23, 2002, to be heard on the Agreed Disposition of the Virginia State Bar and the Respondent, based upon the Certification of the Third District, Section One Subcommittee. The Agreed Disposition was considered by a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board consisting of Anthony J. Trenga, Theophlise L. Twitty, Robert L. Freed, Chester J. Cahoon, Jr., and Randy I.. Bellows, presiding.

Charlotte P. Hodges, representing the Bar and Respondent, Paul C. Bland, appearing pro se, presented an endorsed Agreed Disposition reflecting the terms of the Agreed Disposition. The Board incorporated two changes which included the stipulation of facts and rule violations pertaining to VSB Docket #00-031-3456 (Anthony Thomas), as they were outlined in the Certification dated and the alternate disposition should Respondent fail to fulfill any of the terms, which were ratified by Assistant Bar Counsel and Respondent.

Having considered the Agreed Disposition, it is the decision of the board that the Agreed Disposition be accepted with the two changes incorporated herein, and the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

1. At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent, Paul Cornelius Bland (hereinafter Bland or Respondent), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

2. On August 14, 1996, Complainant met with Beverly McLean Murray (hereinafter Murray) at Respondent's law office. On that day he signed a fee agreement to have Respondent's law firm represent him in a divorce. On August 19, 1996, Complainant wired $1,000 to Respondent's escrow account per instructions he was given.

3. On August 22, 1996 and September 23, 1996, Respondent received two $500 checks made payable to him from funds held in escrow for Complainant before some or all of the fee had been earned.

4. At the time Respondent withdrew the money, the only entry on the work sheet for Complainant's case was for the preparation of the Bill of Complaint on September 11, 1996.

5. Depositions were scheduled for August 25, 1997 at opposing counsel's office. Murray, who could not make the depositions, made arrangements for Bland to handle them in her absence. Bland, however, failed to show for the depositions and did not advise Complainant that he would not be attending. Thereafter, he told Complainant he knew nothing about the scheduled depositions. A notation in opposing counsel's file indicates Bland called to advise opposing counsel he might have to continue the deposition that day.

6. A short time after the aborted depositions, Murray left Respondent's law office and he became solely responsible for handling Complainant's divorce matter.

7. On several occasions, Complainant attempted to contact Respondent about his case via letter and phone. However, he was unsuccessful in reaching Respondent.

8. Respondent did not refund any money to Complainant in this matter.

The Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct on the part of Paul Cornelius Bland constitutes a violation of the following Rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.

(A) All funds received or held by a lawyer or law firm on behalf of a client, estate or a ward, residing in this State or from a transaction arising in this State, other than reimbursement of advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts and, as to client funds, maintained at a financial institution in a state in which the lawyer maintains a law office, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:

(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay service or other charges or fees imposed by the financial institution may be deposited therein.

(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after they are due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.

(B) A lawyer shall:

(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.

(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which such person is entitled to receive.

• Sometime around mid 1987, Bessie Moorer (hereinafter Moorer or Complainant) hired Respondent to help settle her late uncle's estate.



• The initial work Respondent handled for Complainant involved a partition suit, which took place approximately three years after she hired him.



• After the sale of the home was accomplished, Respondent disbursed the proceeds to the heirs with the exception of Milton Scott (hereinafter Scott), a brother of the deceased. Family members advised Respondent that Scott had disappeared some 18-20 years earlier.



• In 1991, Bland advised Moorer that he would file a Bill of Complaint to declare Scott legally dead, at which point he would be able to make the disbursements of Scott's share of the uncle's estate.



• Thereafter, Respondent neglected to diligently pursue the suit to declare Milton Scott legally dead. Although the partition suit and sale of the home was concluded in 1991, the Bill of Complaint Respondent advised Moorer he would file was not filed until sometime in 1995.



• Following the filing of the suit, there were inordinately lengthy gaps of time between each of the steps Respondent took to move the suit along.



• Complainant and other heirs of the estate Respondent was handling attempted to contact Respondent on numerous occasions over the eight year period in which he was supposedly working on the Bill of Complaint to declare Scott dead.

• Respondent failed to adequately communicate with Moorer or any of the other heirs about the status of the case he was handling despite numerous phone calls and letters by the Complainant and her siblings.



• During the representation of Moorer, Respondent loaned Complainant approximately $650 to pay bills and have her car repaired.

The Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct on the part of Paul Cornelius Bland constitutes a violation of the following Rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 5-103. Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.

(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that the lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

• On January 13, 1997, Respondent was appointed to represent James Charles (hereinafter Charles or Complainant on a delayed appeal of convictions in the Petersburg Circuit Court, after his previous attorney failed to file the appeal.
  

• Respondent properly and timely filed the Appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and a Motion for Reconsideration by three judge panel on behalf of Complainant. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for appeal on October 1, 1997, and the request for three judge panel was denied on October 29, 1997.



• On November 1, 1997, Complainant sent Respondent a letter requesting that he appeal his case to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

• Respondent failed to appeal Complainant's case to the Supreme Court of Virginia.



• During the time Respondent represented Complainant, he failed to adequately communicate with him regarding the status of his case, despite Complainant's attempts to contact him.

The Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct on the part of Paul Cornelius Bland constitutes a violation of the following Rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

• `In June 1990, Respondent began handling a case for his cousin, Gloria Wright (hereinafter Wright), who had been injured on her job in Washington, D.C.

• Respondent, who is also licensed to practice in the District of Columbia, took the case believing it would settle.



• Wright provided Respondent with the name and address of Dynaelectric as the responsible party for her injuries, as well as a contact person with the FECA division at the Department of Labor (DOL).



• In August 1990, Wright wrote to DOL and identified Respondent as her attorney. In February, 1991, DOL responded by letter, sending information about Wright's claim, including information about her medical providers, and offering additional assistance if needed.



• Respondent did not respond to DOL until August 21, 1991 when he sent a one line letter identifying himself as Wright's attorney.



• By April of 1992, Respondent had taken no action on Wright's claim. He had not filed a lawsuit, nor had he attempted to contact her medical providers.



• Respondent was unsure of the address, and the spelling of the defendant company's name. Therefore, he filed suit in the Circuit Court for Fairfax County on May 6, 1992, and in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond on May 18, 1992. He then advised Wright and DOL that the lawsuits had been filed.



• At the request of Dynalectric's counsel and without first consulting his client, Respondent agreed to non-suit the Richmond lawsuit in August 1992 and proceed with the Fairfax case. Afterward, he did not inform his client about the dismissal.



• Dynalectric's counsel represented to Respondent that Dynalectric was not present at the time of the accident and pressed Respondent to dismiss the lawsuit against Dynalectric. A representative from Cafritz Management Company, the building manager made a similar representation to Respondent.
• In October, without conducting further discovery and fearing sanctions, Respondent sent a pleading to non-suit the Fairfax action to Dynalectric's counsel, who refused to sign it, because he believed that plaintiff was only entitled to one non-suit by right, and that one had already been granted in the Richmond case.



• Defense counsel insisted upon a dismissal of the case with prejudice. Respondent agreed, again without seeking his client's permission or informing her about the dismissal.



• In April 1993, Respondent informed his client that the Fairfax action had been non-suited because Dynalectric was not present on the date of the accident. He advised her that he would file a new lawsuit in Superior Court in the District against Donahue, the contractor renovating the office, and Cafritz. The lawsuit was filed in May 1993.



• Defendant Cafritz sought discovery in the form of requests for production of medical records and interrogatories from Wright in August 1993.



• Respondent filed incomplete and unverified answers and failed to produce the requested medical reports. He did not advise his client the information had been requested, nor did he seek her help in obtaining it.



• In January 1994, after deposing Wright, Defendant Cafritz threatened to seek sanctions if the case was not dismissed. Therefore, without his client's knowledge or consent, Respondent agreed to a dismissal of Cafritz with prejudice.
• In late 1993, and early 1994, Respondent communicated with Wright infrequently. He gave her last minute notice of a scheduled independent medical exam and of her need to obtain her medical records. He did not inform her that defendant Donahue moved for summary judgement or that Respondent had filed a response on her behalf one month late.



• Defense counsel for both defendants (Donahue & Dynalectric) continued to press Respondent to no avail for complete interrogatory answers from Wright and for medical reports so that the nature of their client's involvement and the extent of plaintiff's medical damages could be determined.



• In late August 1994, Dynalectric filed a motion for judgement on the pleadings for summary judgement to which Respondent did not respond and filed a motion to compel discovery which the Court granted. At that time, Respondent informed Wright that Dynalectric had been brought into the lawsuit, however, he did not inform her that she had no legal recourse against Dynalectric or why.



• Following the August motions, Respondent became even more unresponsive to Wright's case. He submitted interrogatory answers that were not signed by his client; he attended a scheduled mediation on November 8, 1994 without full preparation; he did not attend the second deposition of Donahue, and he did not prepare and circulate a pretrial statement to opposing counsel in January 1995 as required by the Court's scheduling order.



• The week before the pretrial conference set for Monday, January 23, 1995, Respondent received notice of a hearing scheduled for the same day in a case in federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia.



• On the Friday before the pretrial conference, Respondent called opposing counsel and advised him that Wright would provide him with her medical reports and that Respondent would be unable to attend the pretrial conference.



• He faxed a letter to Wright informing her that it was appropriate for him to withdraw from the case, citing a conflict in his schedule and the distant location of his office.



• On the morning of the pretrial conference, Respondent placed a telephone call to the chambers of the presiding judge and sought to withdraw from the case. When his request was rejected by the Court, Respondent did not appear for the pretrial conference.



• The conference went forward resulting in the dismissal of the case.

The Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct on the part of Paul Cornelius Bland constitutes a violation of the following Rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 2-108. Terminating Representation.

(C) In any court proceeding, counsel of record shall not withdraw except by leave of court after notice to the client of the time and place of a motion for leave to withdraw. In any other matter, a lawyer shall continue representation, notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation, when ordered to do so by a tribunal.

(D) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take reasonable steps for the continued protection of a client's interests, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by applicable law.

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(A) A lawyer shall undertake representation only in matters in which:

(1) The lawyer can act with competence and demonstrate the specific legal knowledge, skill, efficiency, and thoroughness in preparation employed in acceptable practice by lawyers undertaking similar matters, or

(2) The lawyer has associated with another lawyer who is competent in those matters.

(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

(D) A lawyer shall inform his client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter.

DR 7-101. Representing a Client Zealously.

(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:

(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.

(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship, except as required under DR 4-101(D)

• Respondent represented Anthony Thomas (hereinafter Thomas or Complainant) at a criminal trial in the Petersburg Circuit Court in October 1998. Thomas was found guilty, and on November 23, 1998, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals.



• On March 24, 1999, Complainant wrote Respondent requesting a copy of the petition for appeal. On April 1, 1999, Respondent wrote to Complainant advising him the petition had not yet been prepared. On May 3, 1999, Complainant wrote again to Respondent and asked for a copy of the petition for appeal.



• Respondent filed the petition on June 16, 1999, but did not forward a copy of the petition to Complainant.



• The Court of Appeals denied Complainant's appeal on September 9, 1999. On October 1, 1999, Respondent attempted to send Complainant a copy of the notice at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center, where he was no longer housed. The letter was returned to Respondent notifying him Respondent was no longer at that facility.



• On October 7, 1999, Respondent filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on January 14, 2000.



• On February 18, 2000, Respondent once again wrote to Complainant at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center to advise him that his appeal to the Supreme Court was denied. This letter was also returned to Respondent and placed in Complainant's file.



• Respondent would argue that following the return of the second letter, his office contacted the Department of Corrections, which confirmed Complainant's new address.

• During the time he prepared Complainant's appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, Respondent failed to adequately communicate with Complainant.



• Complainant discovered after eight (8) months and many attempts to contact Respondent, that his appeal to the Supreme Court had been denied.

The Disciplinary Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct on the part of Paul Cornelius Bland constitutes a violation of the following Rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

(D) A lawyer shall inform his client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter.

Upon consideration hereof, it is ORDERED that Respondent comply with the following terms:

• Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months beginning August 16, 2002, and shall not accept any new clients between the date of the acceptance of this agreement by a panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board and August 16, 2002, who require anything more than consultations and/or the preparation of documents.
• Respondent agrees to hire a law office management consultant (approved by the Virginia State Bar) to help organize his practice. The consultant should be hired and in a position to complete his/her work prior to Respondent's return from suspension. Respondent shall pay all costs associated with the consultant.
• Respondent shall enroll and attend four (4) hours of Continuing Legal Education Credits in state Civil Procedure, which four (4) hours shall not be applied toward your annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements. You are to certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before April 24, 2003.
• Respondent shall enroll and attend two(2) hours of Continuing Legal Education Credits in federal Civil Procedure, which two (2) hours shall not be applied toward your annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements. You are to certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before January 24, 2003.
• Respondent shall enroll and attend two (2) hours of Continuing Legal Education Credits in Appellate Advocacy or Procedure, which two (2) hours shall not be applied toward your annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements. You are to certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before January 24, 2003.
• Respondent shall enroll and attend two (2) hours of Continuing Legal Education Credits in a Real Property course which covers partition suits, which two (2) hours shall not be applied toward your annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements. You are to certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before April 24, 2003.
• Respondent shall enroll and attend two (2) hours of Continuing Legal Education Credits in trust account and/or client fund management, which two (2) hours shall not be applied toward your annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements. You are to certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before October 24, 2002.
• Respondent shall contact the Virginia Law Foundation and obtain a copy of the publication, Lawyers and Other People's Money. You are to obtain a copy of this publication by June 24, 2002, and certify in writing your compliance with this term directly to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before June 24, 2002.
• You are to provide the Virginia State Bar with a written office policy outlining your procedures for accepting incoming clients and opening files for new cases, for docketing and tracking filing deadlines in cases, and for handling incoming client calls and returning those calls. You are to provide a copy of this policy to Assistant Bar Counsel Charlotte P. Hodges on or before June 24, 2002.
• You will be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year from the period of the end of your suspension (December 16, 2002). During this probationary time period, you shall not engage in any professional misconduct as defined by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Any final, non-appealable determination of misconduct determined by any District Committee, the Disciplinary Board or a Three-Judge panel to have occurred during said one year period shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreed Disposition. Any currently pending matters are excepted from this agreement.

 

If Respondent fails to fulfill any of the terms outlined in the Agreed Disposition, the Board will impose, and Respondent will agree to an eighteen (18) month suspension.

The court reporter for this hearing was Tracey J. Stroh, Chandler & Halasz, Inc.

Pursuant to Part Six, ßIV, �13(K)(10) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess costs.

It is further ORDERED that a copy teste of this Order shall be mailed by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to the Respondent, at his last address of record with the Virginia State Bar, and to Assistant Bar Counsel.

Enter this Order this day of , 2002.







VIRGINIA STATE BAR

DISCIPLINARY BOARD







By:

Randy I. Bellows

2^nd Vice Chair