

VIRGINIA:

Before the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board

In the Matter of

*Philip Alan Liebman
Attorney at Law*

*VSB Docket Nos. 09-022-079868
10-022-080720*

On October 21, 2010, came Philip Alan Liebman and presented to the Board an Affidavit Declaring Consent to Revocation of his license to practice law in the courts of this Commonwealth. By tendering his Consent to Revocation at a time when disciplinary charges are pending, he admits that the charges in the attached Certifications document are true.

The Board having considered the said Affidavit Declaring Consent to Revocation, and Bar Counsel having no objection, the Board accepts his Consent to Revocation. Accordingly, it is ordered that the license to practice law in the courts of this Commonwealth heretofore issued to the said Philip Alan Liebman be and the same hereby is revoked, and that the name of the said Philip Alan Liebman be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of this Commonwealth.

Entered this 25th day of October, 2010

For the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board

*By Barbara S. Lanier
Barbara Sayers Lanier, Clerk of the Disciplinary System*

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

RECEIVED

IN THE MATTERS OF
PHILIP ALAN LIEBMAN

OCT 21 2010

VS B Docket No. 09-022-079868
VS B Docket No. 10-022-080720

VS B CLERK'S OFFICE

AFFIDAVIT DECLARING CONSENT TO REVOCATION

Philip Alan Liebman, after being duly sworn, states as follows:

1. That Philip Alan Liebman was licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia on 09/22/1978;

2. That Philip Alan Liebman submits this Affidavit Declaring Consent to Revocation pursuant to Rule of Court, Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-28.

3. That Philip Alan Liebman's consent to revocation is freely and voluntarily rendered, that Philip Alan Liebman is not being subjected to coercion or duress, and that Philip Alan Liebman is fully aware of the implications of consenting to the revocation of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia;

4. Philip Alan Liebman is aware that there are currently pending two complaints involving allegations of misconduct, the docket numbers for which are set forth above, and the specific nature of which is here set forth:

VS B Docket No. 09-022-079868

1. At all times relevant hereto, Philip Alan Liebman, ("Respondent"), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

2. On or about August 8, 2005, Virdell C. Hawkins retained Respondent to represent her in a personal injury action arising out of her tripping and falling over a Pepsi bottle crate in a supermarket aisle. Although Ms. Hawkins and Respondent agreed that Respondent would handle the personal injury matter on a contingency fee basis, Respondent did not reduce this agreement to any form of writing. There was no fee agreement or retainer agreement.
3. After sending letters of representation to two insurance carriers and gathering medical records, Respondent filed suit in Virginia Beach Circuit Court on February 21, 2006 against the supermarket in *Virdell C. Hawkins v. Harrell & Harrell, Inc.* A third party action against the Pepsi distributor (“Pepsi”) was later filed by the supermarket defendant Harrell & Harrell, (“supermarket”).
4. On December 21, 2006, Respondent had the Court issue the complaint summons for service upon the defendant supermarket.
5. On December 7, 2007, the Court entered a scheduling order setting the case for trial on May 21, 2008. The order imposed discovery deadlines, including a deadline for plaintiff’s identification of trial experts 90 days prior to trial.
6. Respondent faced a number of hurdles to proving not only the extent of damages but the causation as to claimed cervical damage and resulting surgery after it was disclosed that Hawkins had suffered a subsequent fall at another establishment.
7. Notwithstanding the need for expert testimony and notwithstanding the Court’s scheduling order, Respondent failed to identify trial experts before the deadline.

8. By order entered on April 10, 2008, the Court barred Respondent from introducing any expert witness opinion testimony at the trial of the case. Respondent contends that he was unable to obtain an expert witness in the matter as Ms. Hawkins refused to agree to pay for the fees for an expert witness, and therefore Respondent was unable to obtain much less designate an expert witness.
9. On April 10, 2008, the Court further ordered Respondent to fully and completely respond to third-party defendant Pepsi's outstanding discovery by April 16, 2008.
10. Notwithstanding the Court's order, Respondent failed to answer the outstanding discovery. Accordingly, Pepsi moved to dismiss the case.
11. On May 9, 2008, Respondent settled the matter for \$7,000, with the supermarket agreeing to pay \$6,000 and Pepsi agreeing to pay \$1,000.
12. By letter dated May 13, 2008, counsel for the defendant supermarket forwarded a settlement check of \$6,000, a release, and a dismissal order to Respondent with instructions that the release be executed prior to Respondent negotiating the settlement check.
13. Respondent received the two settlement checks totaling \$7,000, the release, and the dismissal order. The case was dismissed when Pepsi's defense counsel tendered the dismissal order to the court without Respondent's endorsement and without execution of the release. Respondent failed to object to the dismissal.
14. Respondent neither created nor provided Ms. Hawkins with a disbursement statement or final accounting for the settlement funds.

Ms. Hawkins had not received any portion of the settlement funds as of the filing of this complaint on August 19, 2009.

Neither settlement check has been negotiated as of the filing of this complaint on August 19, 2009.

15. Notwithstanding her efforts to contact Respondent regarding the status of her case, Ms.

Hawkins contends she did not learn of the settlement and dismissal of her case until she herself went to the courthouse and reviewed the court's file in her case.

16. Hawkins testified under oath at a discovery deposition and in answers to interrogatives that she had surgery as a result of the accident. Opposing counsel found medical records suggesting that the surgery was related to a second and subsequent accident in which Hawkins fell in a parking lot and was knocked unconscious.

17. In her discovery deposition, Hawkins' treating physician testified that his opinion of the causation of her injuries from the incident in question would be different if she had been involved in a second and subsequent incident. Hawkins had not disclosed to the treating physician the second and subsequent incident.

18. The Respondent contends that he informed Hawkins that the likelihood in prevailing in her case was questionable, that she might have been contributorily negligent, that she could not prove her case without paying for the expert witnesses, that her credibility was damaged because of her representations about the injuries from the second accident case, and that she could lose the case and not recover the expert witness fees.

19. The Respondent contends that Hawkins vacillated between settling and not settling the case, and that the Respondent accepted an offer of settlement when Hawkins was in agreement

with the settlement. Respondent further contends that Hawkins picked up two settlement checks from his office.

20. Respondent sought to offer evidence that Hawkins had a pattern of rescinding settlements, and that she had attempted to rescind a settlement with regard to her retirement plan and a settlement regarding child support handled by another attorney. The Virginia State Bar did not investigate this aspect of Respondent's claim and filed a Motion in Limine to exclude such evidence as not relevant to the instant case.

Respondent agrees that the aforesaid conduct set forth in paragraphs 1-17 violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.3 Diligence

- (a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

RULE 1.4 Communication

- (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

RULE 1.5 Fees

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall state in writing the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

RULE 1.15 Safekeeping Property

(a) All funds received or held by a lawyer or law firm on behalf of a client, other than reimbursement of advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable escrow accounts maintained at a financial institution in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:

- (1) funds reasonably sufficient to pay service or other charges or fees imposed by the financial institution may be deposited therein; or
- (2) funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after it is due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.

...

(c) A lawyer shall:

- (1) promptly notify a client of the receipt of the client's funds, securities, or other properties;
- (2) identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable;
- (3) maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them; and
- (4) promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which such person is entitled to receive.

VSB Docket No. 10-022-080720

1. At all times relevant hereto, Philip Alan Liebman, (“Respondent”), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
2. Respondent represented Karmesha Majors as a plaintiff in a personal injury action arising out of an accident occurring on February 3, 2006.
3. On March 5, 2008, Respondent filed a complaint in Virginia Beach Circuit Court styled Karmesha Majors v. Frederick L. Harris.
4. On March 2, 2009, Respondent requested the Clerk of the Court to issue a summons for the service of the complaint. The Clerk issued the summons to Respondent on March 4, 2009.
5. On May 19, 2009, opposing counsel Tom Dawson filed a motion to dismiss for Respondent’s failure to serve the complaint within one year of filing as required under Rule 3.5(e) of the Rules of Court. The matter was noticed for hearing on May 29, 2009.
6. On May 28, 2009, Respondent moved to continue the hearing.
7. On May 28, 2009, Respondent’s process server Richard Lieberman, filed a proof of service along with a transmittal letter explaining that he was late in filing the proof because “I have been ill since serving the paper, and was only recently released from the hospital.”¹ The proof of service as filed had a blank preceding the March, 2009 date of service. It indicated posted service as he found “no one at home.”
8. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to dismiss to the morning of July 24, 2009. On that morning, opposing counsel Dawson examined the Court’s file to confirm

¹ §8.01-294 of the Code of Virginia directs that proof of service be filed with the court within 72 hours of service, although the failure to do so “shall not invalidate any service of process or any judgment based thereon.”

that there was no service as his client had advised him. He found the blank proof of service in the Court's file.

9. Respondent then appeared in the courtroom and asked Dawson about his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Respondent took the file from the court clerk for some 15-20 minutes and then returned it without comment to either Dawson or the court clerk. Respondent would offer evidence that prior to inserting the date into the service affidavit, Respondent obtained the consent of the process server to do so. Because of serious health problems, the process server was not able to come to the courthouse and testify at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
10. Dawson then examined the file again and found that Respondent had inserted the number "3" into the blank space preceding "March" in the proof of service.
11. At the ensuing hearing, Dawson advised the court there had been no service of the complaint, that Respondent had altered the court's document by inserting the date of 3 in front of March, and that it was impossible to have been occurred since the Court had not issued the summons for process until March 4.
12. Only after being confronted with Dawson's argument and questions of the Court did Respondent admit to having altered the proof of service, a document in the Court's file.
13. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the complaint.

Respondent agrees that the aforesaid conduct set forth in paragraphs 1-13 violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyers fitness to practice law;

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(a) Obstruct another party's access to evidence or alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value for the purpose of obstructing a party's access to evidence. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.

...

(c) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or pay:

...

5. Philip Alan Liebman acknowledges that the material facts upon which the aforesaid allegations of misconduct in the aforementioned two cases are predicated are true; and

6. Philip Alan Liebman submits this Affidavit and consents to the revocation of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia effective October 15, 2010 because he knows that if the disciplinary proceedings based on the said alleged misconduct were brought or prosecuted to a conclusion, he could not successfully defend them.

Executed and dated on _____.


Philip Alan Liebman
Philip Alan Liebman
Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, to wit:

The foregoing Affidavit Declaring Consent to Revocation was subscribed and sworn to before
me by Philip Alan Liebman on October 21, 2010.

Barbara C. Mayo
Notary Public

My Commission expires: December 31, 2010
Registration number: 321931



VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE SECOND DISTRICT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

IN THE MATTER OF
PHILIP ALAN LIEBMAN

VS B Docket No. 09-022-079868
(Virdell C. Hawkins)

SUBCOMMITTEE DETERMINATION
(CERTIFICATION)

On the 10th day of March, 2010, a meeting in this matter was held before a duly convened Second District Subcommittee consisting of Brandon H. Ziegler, Esquire, member, Mr. William W. King, lay member, and Bobby W. Davis, Esquire, Chair.

Pursuant to Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-15.B.3. of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, the Second District Subcommittee of the Virginia State Bar hereby serves upon the Respondent the following Certification:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant hereto, Philip Alan Liebman, ("Respondent"), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
2. On or about August 8, 2005, Virdell C. Hawkins retained Respondent to represent her in a personal injury action arising out of her tripping and falling over a Pepsi bottle crate in a supermarket aisle. Although Ms. Hawkins and Respondent agreed that Respondent would handle the personal injury matter on a contingency fee basis, Respondent did not reduce this agreement to any form of writing. There was no fee agreement or retainer agreement.
3. After sending letters of representation to two insurance carriers and gathering medical records, Respondent filed suit in Virginia Beach Circuit Court on February 21, 2006 against the supermarket in *Virdell C. Hawkins v. Harrell & Harrell, Inc.* A third party

action against the Pepsi distributor ("Pepsi") was later filed by the supermarket defendant Harrell & Harrell, ("supermarket").

4. On December 21, 2006, Respondent had the Court issue the complaint summons for service upon the defendant supermarket.
5. Thereafter, Respondent took no further steps to prosecute the matter, as he failed to make settlement demands, failed to respond to settlement offers, failed to timely respond to discovery, and failed to propound any discovery.
6. On December 7, 2007, the Court entered a scheduling order setting the case for trial on May 21, 2008. The order imposed discovery deadlines, including a deadline for plaintiff's identification of trial experts 90 days prior to trial.
7. Respondent faced a number of hurdles to proving not only the extent of damages but the causation as to claimed cervical damage and resulting surgery after it was disclosed that Hawkins had suffered a subsequent fall at another establishment.
8. Notwithstanding the need for expert testimony and notwithstanding the Court's scheduling order, Respondent failed to identify trial experts before the deadline.
9. By order entered on April 10, 2008, the Court barred Respondent from introducing any expert witness opinion testimony at the trial of the case.
10. On April 10, 2008, the Court further ordered Respondent to fully and completely respond to third-party defendant Pepsi's outstanding discovery by April 16, 2008.
11. Notwithstanding the Court's order, Respondent failed to answer the outstanding discovery. Accordingly, Pepsi moved to dismiss the case.
12. On May 9, 2008, Respondent settled the matter for \$7,000, with the supermarket agreeing to pay \$6,000 and Pepsi agreeing to pay \$1,000.

13. By letter dated May 13, 2008, counsel for the defendant supermarket forwarded a settlement check of \$6,000, a release, and a dismissal order to Respondent with instructions that the release be executed prior to Respondent negotiating the settlement check.
14. Respondent received the two settlement checks totaling \$7,000, the release, and the dismissal order. The case was dismissed when Pepsi's defense counsel tendered the dismissal order to the court without Respondent's endorsement and without execution of the release. Respondent failed to object to the dismissal.
15. Respondent has no records of receiving the settlement funds, although he admits receiving them.
16. Respondent neither created nor provided Ms. Hawkins with a disbursement statement or final accounting for the settlement funds.
17. Ms. Hawkins has not received any portion of the settlement funds.
18. Neither settlement check has been negotiated.
19. Notwithstanding her efforts to contact Respondent regarding the status of her case, Ms. Hawkins did not learn of the settlement and dismissal of her case until she herself went to the courthouse and reviewed the court's file in her case.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

Such conduct by Philip Alan Liebman constitutes misconduct in violation of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.1 Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

RULE 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

RULE 1.5 Fees

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall state in writing the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

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- (2) funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after it is due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.

...

- (c) A lawyer shall:
- (1) promptly notify a client of the receipt of the client's funds, securities, or other properties;
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 - (3) maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them; and
 - (4) promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which such person is entitled to receive.

III. CERTIFICATION

Accordingly, it is the decision of the subcommittee to certify the above matters to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board.

SECOND DISTRICT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

By



Bobby W. Davis, Esq.
Chair

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 26th day of March, 2010, I mailed by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Subcommittee Determination (Certification) to Philip Alan Liebman, Esquire, Respondent, *pro se*, at Laskin Towers, Suite 110, 1917 Laskin Road, Virginia Beach, VA 23454-4283, the Respondent's last address of record with the Virginia State Bar.



Paul D. Georgiadis
Assistant Bar Counsel

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE SECOND DISTRICT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

IN THE MATTER OF
PHILIP ALAN LIEBMAN

VSB Docket No. 10-022-080720
(Thomas Charles Dawson, Jr.)

SUBCOMMITTEE DETERMINATION
(CERTIFICATION)

On the 10th day of March, 2010, a meeting in this matter was held before a duly convened Second District Subcommittee consisting of Brandon H. Ziegler, Esquire, member, Mr. William W. King, lay member, and Bobby W. Davis, Esquire, Chair.

Pursuant to Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-15.B.3. of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, the Second District Subcommittee of the Virginia State Bar hereby serves upon the Respondent the following Certification:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant hereto, Philip Alan Liebman, ("Respondent"), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
2. Respondent represented Karmesha Majors as a plaintiff in a personal injury action arising out of an accident occurring on February 3, 2006.
3. On March 5, 2008, Respondent filed a complaint in Virginia Beach Circuit Court styled Karmesha Majors v. Frederick L. Harris.
4. On March 2, 2009, Respondent requested the Clerk of the Court to issue a summons for the service of the complaint. The Clerk issued the summons to Respondent on March 4, 2009.

5. On May 19, 2009, opposing counsel, Tom Dawson filed a motion to dismiss for Respondent's failure to serve the complaint within one year of filing as required under Rule 3.5(e) of the Rules of Court. The matter was noticed for hearing on May 29, 2009.
6. On May 28, 2009, Respondent moved to continue the hearing.
7. On May 28, 2009, Respondent's process server Richard Lieberman, filed a proof of service along with a transmittal letter explaining that he was late in filing the proof because "I have been ill since serving the paper, and was only recently released from the hospital." ¹ The proof of service as filed had a blank preceding the March, 2009 date of service. It indicated posted service as he found "no one at home."
8. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to dismiss to the morning of July 24, 2009. On that morning, opposing counsel Dawson examined the Court's file to confirm that there was no service as his client had advised him. He found the blank proof of service in the Court's file.
9. Respondent then appeared in the courtroom and asked Dawson about his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Respondent took the file from the court clerk for some 15-20 minutes and then returned it without comment to either Dawson or the court clerk.
10. Dawson then examined the file again and found that Respondent had inserted the number "3" into the blank space preceding "March" in the proof of service.
11. At the ensuing hearing, Dawson advised the court there had been no service of the complaint, that Respondent had altered the court's document by inserting the date of 3 in front of March, and that it was impossible to have been occurred since the Court had not issued the summons for process until March 4.

12. Only after being confronted with Dawson's argument and questions of the Court did Respondent admit to having altered the proof of service, a document in the Court's file.
13. Notwithstanding Respondent's representations to the Court, no posted service was ever made upon defendant Frederick L. Harris.
14. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the complaint.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

Such conduct by Philip Alan Liebman constitutes misconduct in violation of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyers fitness to practice law;

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

- (a) Obstruct another party's access to evidence or alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value for the purpose of obstructing a party's access to evidence. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.
...
- (c) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or pay:
...

¹ §8.01-294 of the Code of Virginia directs that proof of service be filed with the court within 72 hours of service, although the failure to do so "shall not invalidate any service of process or any judgment based thereon."

III. CERTIFICATION

Accordingly, it is the decision of the subcommittee to certify the above matters to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board.

SECOND DISTRICT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

By 
Bobby W. Davis
Subcommittee Chair

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 26th day of March, 2010, I mailed by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Subcommittee Determination (Certification) to Philip Alan Liebman, Esquire, Respondent, *pro se*, at Laskin Towers, Suite 110, 1917 Laskin Road, Virginia Beach, VA 23454-4283, the Respondent's last address of record with the Virginia State Bar.


Paul D. Georgiadis
Assistant Bar Counsel