

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF

GLENN CHARLES LEWIS

VS. B DOCKET NOS.

12-051-089657

12-051-090990

ORDER OF REVOCATION

This matter came to be heard on Friday, May 17, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. before a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board sitting at the general Assembly Building, House Room D, 910 Capitol Street, Richmond, Virginia. The panel consisted of Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, who served as chair, Glenn M. Hodge, John Sykes Barr, Esther J. Windmueller, and Rev. W. Ray Inscoc, Lay member.

Valarie L. Schmit May, court reporter from Chandler & Halasz, P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, Virginia 23227, 804-730-1222, after being duly sworn, reported the hearing and transcribed the proceedings. All required notices of the date and place of the hearing were timely sent by the Clerk of the Disciplinary System in the manner prescribed by law.

The Virginia State Bar (the "Bar") was represented by Paul D. Georgiadis. The Respondent, Glenn Charles Lewis, appeared in person and was represented by Michael L. Rigsby.

The Chair polled the members of the panel as to whether any of them was conscious of any personal or financial interest or bias which would preclude any of them from fairly hearing the matter and serving on the panel, to which inquiry each member responded in the negative.

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the Respondent moved the hearing be continued as the Respondent was delayed in traffic. That motion was denied.¹²

¹ The Respondent was delayed due to traffic. His counsel, after telephonic consultation with Respondent, agreed to allow the presentation of the Bar's evidence before Respondent's arrival. During the presentation of the Bar's evidence, a telephonic speaker system was established which enabled Respondent to participate from his vehicle. Respondent arrived during the Bar's case-in-chief and was present for the remainder of the proceeding. No objections were made to this arrangement, and the Respondent apologized for his tardiness.

The matter came before the Board on two Fifth District Committee Determinations for Certification: VSB Docket No. 12-051-089657, (James M. Pettorini), dated December 19, 2012, and VSB Docket No. 12-051-090990, (D. Glenn Kerr), dated February 13, 2013.

I. VSB Docket No. 12-051-089657

A. Findings Of Fact

The Chair admitted the Bar's exhibits into evidence as VSB Exhibit Group A, subparts 1-21. The Chair denied the Bar's motion *in limine* to exclude all evidence of impairment during the misconduct phase of the hearing.³ The witnesses were sworn and the Chair granted Respondent's request for a rule on witnesses. Messrs. Pettorini and Kerr were allowed to remain in the hearing room as the complainants.

Following opening statements, the Bar was permitted, with Respondent's consent, to present evidence with respect to both misconduct cases in sequential order for purposes of convenience. The Bar called as witnesses Nupur Bal, James Pettorini, David Jackson, D. Glenn Kerr and Ben DiMuro. The Respondent testified in his case.

After the presentation of evidence, the parties gave closing arguments and the Board recessed to deliberate. After reviewing the exhibits and testimonial evidence, the Board made the following findings of fact, by clear and convincing evidence:

1. At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Respondent received proper notice of the proceeding as required by Part Six, § IV, ¶ 13-12 C. and 13-18 C. of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court.
2. On or about August 22, 2011, James Pettorini consulted with Respondent to represent him in a domestic relations case in which Pettorini was a defendant in a show cause matter concerning his two minor sons. Pettorini also wanted to modify visitation and custodial issues.

³ The Bar filed a written motion with the Clerk's Office prior to the hearing.

3. As the Respondent was not yet retained, Respondent advised Pettorini to attend the hearing in the Alexandria Circuit Court on August 24, 2011 and request a continuance. Pettorini did so, and the matter was rescheduled for September 28, 2011.
4. Pettorini retained Respondent on August 25, 2011 by tendering a \$25,000 advance payment and signing a Contract of Representation, dated August 23, 2011 and signed on September 2, 2011. Pettorini told Respondent the show cause matter had been continued to September 28, 2011. Respondent deposited the check into a new trust account. The contract obligated Respondent to provide detailed periodic statements regarding services, costs and fees expended during the representation.
5. Shortly before the September 28, 2011 hearing date, Respondent advised Mr. Pettorini not to appear at the hearing as Respondent believed that Pettorini had not properly been served with notice of the hearing. Pettorini had found a notice on the front step of his house.
6. Neither Pettorini nor Respondent appeared at the September 28, 2011 hearing. In Pettorini's absence, the Alexandria Circuit Court found that Pettorini had failed to abide by previously ordered custody and visitation provisions. The Court ordered a visitation schedule and other terms, found Pettorini in contempt and awarded his ex-spouse \$1,000 in attorney's fees to be assessed against Pettorini.
7. Immediately thereafter, Respondent advised Pettorini that he would move to vacate the order on or before October 5, 2011 and to set the matter for a new hearing. Although Pettorini prompted Respondent repeatedly with telephone calls and emails, Respondent failed to file the motion to vacate by the Court's deadline of October 5, 2011.
8. The Alexandria Circuit Court rules require that motions must be filed one week before a scheduled hearing date. Pettorini was aware of that rule and requested that he be given a draft copy of the motion to review prior to its filing. Respondent agreed to do so.
9. During this time period, Respondent was rarely at his office and very difficult to access by phone by Pettorini or Respondent's associate, Nupur Bal. On October 3, 2011, Bal went to Respondent's home to personally resign from the firm. She described the meeting as very dramatic. Bal testified that the time she spent working for clients was memorialized by the firm's time management system.
10. On October 4, 2011, Pettorini emailed Respondent, concerned that he had not seen a draft of the motion to vacate and requesting that he be provided a draft by 5:00 p.m. for review. The same day, Bal completed a draft of the motion to vacate and forwarded it to Respondent at approximately 12:00 p.m. Bal testified that, as this was not her case, she did not have authority to sign the pleading.
11. Respondent returned to Bal an edited motion to vacate at 2:13 p.m. on October 5, 2011 without a signature. Respondent indicated that Bal should sign and file it. Bal received the motion at approximately 2:50 p.m. In reviewing the edited motion, Bal was uncomfortable with the aggressive tone of the motion and did not want to add her name to the document. Further she did not feel it appropriate as she had given her resignation notice. Lastly, she

noted that even had she made the revisions and attempted to file the motion, she would not have had enough time to travel from Washington, D.C. to the Alexandria courthouse in time to file the motion. No motion was filed on this date.

12. At 5:26 p.m. on October 5, 2011, Pettorini emailed Respondent, firing him, demanding a copy of the file, an accounting of time spent on the matter and a refund of unearned funds. He advised Respondent that he was following Bal to her new firm, the Condo Law Group, PC.
13. On October 7, 2011, Respondent emailed Pettorini indicating that Bal was responsible for the failure to file the motion and apologized for not having filed the motion. Although Respondent promised to produce the file and an accounting, he produced neither.
14. On October 12, 2011, Respondent demanded the return of all of his money and filed a bar complaint. Despite further demands by Pettorini, no advanced legal fees were returned.
15. On November 11, 2011, Bal, through her new firm, appeared at a hearing on the motion to vacate and was able to obtain a vacation of the finding of contempt. The assessment of attorneys fees awarded against Pettorini, in the amount of \$1,000, was not withdrawn and Pettorini paid those costs during the required time period. Bal testified that she prepared the motion to vacate without access to the Pettorini file, which was still in the possession of the Respondent. Bal charged a fee of \$600 for drafting and appearing in court.
16. On November 9, 2011, Pettorini sued Respondent for the return of his advance payment. Pettorini was represented by Ben DiMuro. The Alexandria Circuit Court ordered expedited discovery in the matter (CL1104943) and directed the Respondent to provide accounting records, bank statements, and other financial information. DiMuro experienced great difficulty serving Respondent but eventually effected service following DiMuro's investigation.
17. On December 14, 2011, the Alexandria Circuit Court granted Pettorini's Motion to Compel discovery and sanctioned Respondent in the amount of \$1,500. On that date, Respondent appeared by counsel Peter Greenspun. Pettorini ultimately received a judgment in the matter. The Respondent attempted to discharge the judgment in a bankruptcy proceeding instituted by Respondent on December 29, 2011. The Bankruptcy Court did not discharge the judgment.
18. The Respondent maintained a Virginia IOLTA account ("trust account") in which he placed the monies of both Complainants. A review of the trust account records indicates the following:
 - On August 26, 2011, Respondent deposited in the trust account the amount of \$25,000, which represented a fee advance by Pettorini;
 - On September 1, 2011, Respondent transferred \$7,180 to his operating account.
 - On September 9, 2011, Respondent deposited in the trust account the amount of

\$13,000, which represented a fee advance by D. Glenn Kerr. (See VSB Docket number, 12-051-090990 herein).

- On September 12, 2011, Respondent transferred \$7,191 to his operating account.
 - On September 13, 2011, Respondent transferred \$18,000 to his operating account.
 - On September 16, 2011, the bank debited the trust account the sum of \$60.47 for costs relating an order for checks, leaving a balance of \$5,568.53.
 - On December 1, 2011, Respondent transferred \$5,500 to his operating account, leaving a balance of \$68.53.
20. Respondent never answered the complaint in this matter, never responded to the subpoena *duces tecum* issued by the Fifth District Subcommittee on November 14, 2011, and never responded to requests from the Bar investigator for an interview. On December 27, 2011, Respondent was issued an interim administrative suspension for failing to respond to the Bar's subpoena *duces tecum*.
21. During this time period, Respondent suffered from chronic pain and depression.
22. Respondent has made significant contributions to the legal community and the community at large by various volunteer efforts including, but not limited to, service as the President of the Virginia Bar Association, a prolific CLE presenter (for a multitude of organizations including the Virginia State Bar), a judicial lecturer, and President of the Fairfax Bar Association. Respondent's contributions have been significant and extensive. See Respondent's Exhibit 3.

B. Nature Of Misconduct

The Board finds that such conduct constitutes violations of the following provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct:

Rule 1.3 Diligence

- (a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
- (b) A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services but may withdraw as permitted under Rule 1.16.

Rule 1.4 Communication

- (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

Rule 1.5 Fees

- (a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
 - (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
 - (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
 - (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
 - (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
 - (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
 - (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property

(b) Specific Duties. A lawyer shall:

- (3) maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accountings to the client regarding them;
- (4) promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer that such person is entitled to receive; and
- (5) not disburse funds or use property of a client or third party without their consent or convert funds or property of a client or third party, except as directed by a tribunal.

(c) Record-Keeping Requirements. A lawyer shall, at a minimum, maintain the following books and records demonstrating compliance with this Rule:

- (1) Cash receipts and disbursements journals for each trust account, including entries for receipts, disbursements, and transfers, and also including, at a minimum: an identification of the client matter; the date of the transaction; the name of the payor or payee; and the manner in which trust funds were received, disbursed, or transferred from an account.
- (2) A subsidiary ledger containing a separate entry for each client, other person, or entity from whom money has been received in trust.

The ledger should clearly identify:

- (i) the client or matter, including the date of the transaction and the payor or payee and the means or methods by which trust funds were received, disbursed or transferred; and
- (ii) any unexpended balance.

Rule 1.16 Declining Or Terminating Representation

(e) All original, client-furnished documents and any originals of legal instruments or official documents which are in the lawyer's possession (wills, corporate minutes, etc.) are the property of the client and, therefore, upon termination of the representation, those items shall be returned within a reasonable time to the client or the client's new counsel upon request, whether or not the client has paid the fees and costs owed the lawyer. If the lawyer wants to keep a copy of such original documents, the lawyer must incur the cost of duplication. Also upon termination, the client, upon request, must also be provided within a reasonable time copies of the following documents from the lawyer's file, whether or not the client has paid the fees and costs owed the lawyer: lawyer/client and lawyer/third-party communications; the lawyer's copies of client-furnished documents (unless the originals have been returned to the client pursuant to this paragraph); transcripts, pleadings and discovery responses; working and final drafts of legal instruments, official documents, investigative reports, legal memoranda, and other attorney work product documents prepared or collected for the client in the course of the representation; research materials; and bills previously submitted to the client. Although the lawyer may bill and seek to collect from the client the costs associated with making a copy of these materials, the lawyer may not use the client's refusal to pay for such materials as a basis to refuse the client's request. The lawyer, however, is not required under this Rule to provide the client copies of billing records and documents intended only for internal use, such as memoranda prepared by the lawyer discussing conflicts of interest, staffing considerations, or difficulties arising from the lawyer-client relationship. The lawyer has met his or her obligation under this paragraph by furnishing these items one time at client request upon termination; provision of multiple copies is not required. The lawyer has not met his or her obligation under this paragraph by the mere provision of copies of documents on an item-by-item basis during the course of the representation.

Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer already admitted to the bar, in connection with a bar admission application, any certification required to be filed as a condition of maintaining or renewing a license to practice law, or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (c) fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6

Rule 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

II. VSB Docket No. 12-051-090990

A. Findings Of Fact

The Chair admitted the Bar's exhibits into evidence as VSB Exhibit Group B, subparts 1-13. After the presentation of evidence, the parties gave closing arguments and the Board recessed to deliberate. After reviewing the exhibits and testimonial evidence, the Board made the following findings of fact, by clear and convincing evidence:

1. At all times relevant hereto, Glenn Charles Lewis, hereinafter the "Respondent," was an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Respondent received proper notice of the proceeding as required by Part Six, § IV, ¶ 13-12 C. and 13-18 C. of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court.
2. On or about August 18, 2011, Darrell Kerr hired Respondent to represent him in an anticipated divorce action.
3. On September 2, 2011, Kerr paid Respondent an advance payment of legal fees in the amount of \$13,000 by personal check noting "Legal Retainer." Kerr signed a detailed engagement agreement that same day. The agreement obligated Respondent to provide detailed periodic statements regarding services, costs, fees etc. expended during the representation.
4. On September 9, 2011, Respondent deposited the check into his trust account.
5. During this time period, Respondent was rarely at his office and very difficult to access by phone by Kerr or Respondent's associate, Nupur Bal. On October 3, 2011, Bal had to track Respondent down at his home so that she could resign in person. She described that meeting as very dramatic.
6. Ms. Bal reported that a lot of time was spent working on the Kerr case. See Respondent's Exhibit #1.

7. On October 22, 2011, Kerr emailed Respondent as he was concerned about how much of his funds were being spent and advised Respondent to stop all work.
8. On October 27, 2011 Kerr emailed Respondent and indicated that he would be using Ms. Bal as his attorney at her new firm, Condo Group, PC. Kerr asked for a final accounting and the balance of any unearned advance.
9. At the onset of the representation, Kerr provided Respondent with his credit card information in the event further funds were needed to cover the costs of the representation.
10. On October 31, 2011, Respondent charged Kerr's credit card twice, for a total of \$11,975.
11. Kerr challenged those charges with his credit card company. In defense of the charge, Respondent submitted to the credit card company a six-page defense of the charges wherein he justifies the fee charged, although he never filed any paperwork with the court nor provided any accounting to Kerr. Ms. Bal testified that any time she spent in the matter was memorialized by the firm's time management system. Respondent further accused Kerr and Bal of creating a conspiracy to fund her fee at her new firm, and alleged that Kerr owed him even more money than the \$24,975 kept by Respondent.
12. The Respondent maintained a Virginia IOLTA account ("trust account") in which he placed the monies of both Complainants. A review of the account records indicates the following:
 - On August 26, 2011, Respondent deposited in the trust account the amount of \$25,000, which represented a fee advance by Pettorini;
 - On September 1, 2011, Respondent transferred \$7,180 to his operating account.
 - On September 9, 2011, Respondent deposited in the trust account the amount of \$13,000, which represented a fee advance by D. Glenn Kerr. (See VSB Docket number, 12-051-090990 herein).
 - On September 12, 2011, Respondent transferred \$7,191 to his operating account.
 - On September 13, 2011, Respondent transferred \$18,000 to his operating account.
 - On September 16, 2011, the bank debited the trust account the sum of \$60.47 for costs relating an order for checks, leaving a balance of \$5,568.53.
 - On December 1, 2011, Respondent transferred \$5,500 to his operating account, leaving a balance of \$68.53.
13. Mr. Kerr ultimately prevailed with his credit card company and the \$11,975 was ultimately credited back to him.
14. Respondent never responded to a subpoena *duces tecum* issued by the Fifth District

Subcommittee on November 27, 2011, nor did the Respondent respond to requests from the Bar Investigator for an interview. On January 23, 2013, Respondent was issued an interim administrative suspension for failing to respond to the subpoena *duces tecum*.

15. During this time period, Respondent suffered from chronic pain and depression.
16. Respondent has made significant contributions to the legal community and the community at large by various volunteer efforts including but not limited to service as the President of the Virginia Bar Association, a prolific CLE presenter (for a multitude of organizations including the Virginia State Bar), a judicial lecturer, and President of the Fairfax Bar. Respondent's contributions have been significant and extensive. See Respondent's Exhibit 3.

B. Nature Of Misconduct

Such conduct constitutes violations of the following provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct:

Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property

(b) Specific Duties. A lawyer shall:

(3) maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accountings to the client regarding them;

(5) not disburse funds or use property of a client or third party without their consent or convert funds or property of a client or third party, except as directed by a tribunal.

(c) Record-Keeping Requirements. A lawyer shall, at a minimum, maintain the following books and records demonstrating compliance with this Rule:

(1) Cash receipts and disbursements journals for each trust account, including entries for receipts, disbursements, and transfers, and also including, at a minimum: an identification of the client matter; the date of the transaction; the name of the payor or payee; and the manner in which trust funds were received, disbursed, or transferred from an account.

(2) A subsidiary ledger containing a separate entry for each client, other person, or entity from whom money has been received in trust.

The ledger should clearly identify:

(i) the client or matter, including the date of the transaction and the payor or payee and the means or methods by which trust funds were received, disbursed or transferred; and

(ii) any unexpended balance.

Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer already admitted to the bar, in connection with a bar admission application, any certification required to be filed as a condition of maintaining or renewing a license to practice law, or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (c) fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6

Rule 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

The Board did not find a violation of Rule 1.5 and that violation was dismissed.

III. Combined Disposition - Revocation

Upon review of the foregoing findings of fact, testimony and exhibits presented by Bar Counsel on behalf of the VSB as Exhibits Group A, subparts 1-21 and Group B, subparts 1-13, and Bar Exhibit C, Respondent's Exhibits 1-3, and upon evidence presented by Respondent in the form of his own testimony and that of his wife, and at the conclusion of the evidence regarding misconduct, the Board recessed to deliberate. After due deliberation the Board reconvened and stated its findings as follows:

The Board determined that the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent was in violation of the aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct.

Thereafter, the Board received further evidence of aggravation and mitigation from the Bar and Respondent. The Board recessed to deliberate what sanction to impose upon its finding of misconduct by Respondent. After due deliberation the Board reconvened to announce the sanction

imposed. The Board considered five aggravating factors listed in the American Bar Associations Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:

1. Respondent's multiple offenses;
2. Respondent's bad faith obstruction of disciplinary proceedings by failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
3. Respondent's refusal to acknowledge the nature of his wrongful conduct;
4. Respondent's substantial experience in the practice of law; and
5. Respondent's indifference to making restitution.

The panel also considered three mitigating factors:

1. The absence of a prior disciplinary record;
2. personal or emotional problems; and
3. Respondent's character or reputation

The Board weighed the substantial contribution the Respondent has made to the legal profession and the community against the very real harm caused to the complainants, Respondent's unrepentant attitude and his attempts to frustrate the disciplinary process and other legal proceedings. After a review of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the panel unanimously agreed that the sanction of Revocation is warranted. Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Respondent, Glenn Charles Lewis be REVOKED from the practice of law effective May 17, 2013.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent must comply with the requirements of Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13-29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Respondent shall forthwith give notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the Revocation of Respondent's license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, to all clients for whom Respondent is currently handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and presiding judges in pending litigation. The Respondent shall also make appropriate arrangements for the disposition of matters then in Respondent's care in conformity with the wishes of Respondent's clients. Respondent shall give such notice within fourteen (14) days of the effective date of this order, and make such

arrangements as are required herein within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the revocation. The Respondent shall also furnish proof to the Bar within sixty (60) days of the effective day of this order that such notices have been timely given and such arrangements made for the disposition of matters.


It is further ORDERED that if the Respondent is not handling any client matters on the effective date of this order, Respondent shall submit an affidavit to that effect to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System at the Virginia State Bar. All issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and arrangements required by Paragraph 13 shall be determined by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, unless the Respondent makes a timely request for hearing before a three-judge court.

It is further ORDERED that pursuant to Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13-9E of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess all costs against the Respondent.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall mail an attested copy of this order to Respondent, Glenn Charles Lewis, at his address of record with the Virginia State Bar, The Lewis Law Firm A Professional Corporation, 9728 Cheriton Court, Vienna, Virginia 22181, by certified mail, and by regular mail to Michael L. Rigsby, Esq., Counsel for Respondent, at Michael L. Rigsby, PC, P.O. Box 29328, Henrico, Virginia 23242. The Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall also hand-deliver a copy of this order to Paul D. Georgiadis, Assistant Bar Counsel, 707 East Main Street, Suite 1500, Richmond, Virginia 23219.

ENTERED THIS 30th DAY OF JUNE, 2013

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD



Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, First Vice Chair