VIRGINIA:


THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF
ANDREW ROBERT SEBOK


VSB DOCKET NUMBERS: 98-022-0677
98-022-1378
98-022-1502
99-022-0319
99-022-0351
99-021-0520
99-022-1480
99-021-2082
99-022-2913
00-021-0306


ORDER

THIS MATTER came to be heard on February 22 and 23, 2001, before a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, consisting of William M. Moffet, Chair presiding, Robert E. Eicher, Janipher W. Robinson, Werner H. Quasebarth, Lay Member, and Bruce T. Clark. The Respondent, Andrew Robert Sebok, was present and was represented by James C. Roberts and Matthew M. Farley. Charlotte P. Hodges, Assistant Bar Counsel, appeared on behalf the Virginia State Bar.
All matters heard came before the Board on certification of the Second District Subcommittee.
Donna T. Chandler, Chandler and Halasz, Inc., P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, VA 23227, phone number 804/730-1222, having been duly sworn by the chairman presiding, reported the proceedings.
The chairman of the panel inquired of each panel member at the outset of the hearing whether there was any conflict of interest, personal or financial, that would disqualify any member from serving on the panel, and each of the panel members and chairman stated for the record that no such conflict of interest existed.
At all relevant times hereto, the Respondent, Andrew Robert Sebok, was an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Following a two-day hearing, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board made the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.

VSB DOCKET # 99-022-0351 (DEMETRIUS D. BAKER)
1. On or about June 22, 1998, the Complainant, Demetrius D. Baker (hereinafter Baker) hired Respondent and paid him $200.00 to have his probation modified so he could join the United States Marine Corps.
2 Respondent advised Baker that he would charge him $400.00 to handle the matter for him. No written agreement, contract or engagement letter was signed.
3. On July 5, 1998, Baker gave the Respondent an additional $200.00.
4. Respondent deposited the $400.00 in his personal account. At the time he did so, some or all of the fee remained unearned.
5. Respondent did nothing on the client's case until August 1998, despite promises in July 1998 that he would begin working on the case right away.
6. On August 10, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Judge Edward W. Hanson, Jr., of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, requesting that the remainder of Baker's sentence be commuted. Judge Hanson advised Respondent to contact the Commonwealth's Attorney in the original matter.
7. Respondent contacted the Commonwealth's Attorney and was advised as to the proper procedure for docketing his motion and having it heard by the judge.
8. Respondent obtained the relief sought by Order entered on March 25, 1999.
Based upon the evidence presented and the Respondent's own answer to the certification and testimony that he did not deposit unearned fee in a trust account, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence violation of the following Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
 (A) All funds received or held by a lawyer or law firm on behalf of a client, estate or a ward, residing in this State or from a transaction arising in this State, other than reimbursement of advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts and, as to client funds, maintained at a financial institution in a state in which the lawyer maintains a law office, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay service or other charges or fees imposed by the financial institution may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after they are due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented, the Board finds that allegations that Respondent violated DR 2-105 (A), DR 2-108 (D), DR 6-101 (B), DR 6-101 (C), and DR 6-101 (D) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.

VSB DOCKET # 98-022-1378 (YUKIMASA WATANABE)
9. The Respondent was retained by Yukimasa Watanabe (hereinafter Watanabe), a Japanese citizen. At the time the Respondent met with Watanabe, Watanabe was in the United States on a non-immigrant visa. Watanabe wished to obtain an immigrant visa so as to allow him the ability to establish a business in the United States, specifically a professional wrestling business.
10. The Respondent advised Watanabe that he needed to establish an actual business in the United States and suggested that it be incorporated and that subsequently the Respondent could apply for an H1-B visa.
11. Subsequently, the Respondent did file Articles of Incorporation for the United Nations Wrestling U.S.A. business entity on behalf of Watanabe.
12. There were no witnesses called by the Bar to support the allegations set out in the certification.
Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented, the Board finds that the allegations that Respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108(D), DR 9-102(A) and DR 9-102(B) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.

VSB DOCKET # 99-021-0520 (MICHAEL & CARMEN LOFTIN)
13. In January 1998, the Complainants, Michael and Carmen Loftin (hereinafter the Loftins) hired the Respondent to handle an immigration matter for Carmen Loftin.
14. The Respondent charged the Loftins $2,500.00 to represent them. The Loftins paid the Respondent the $2,500.00 in three increments: $1,000.00 by money order on or about February 20, 1998; $500.00 by money order on March 9, 1998; and, $1,000.00 by money order on March 10, 1998. No written retainer agreement, contract or engagement letter was signed.
15. The Respondent immediately placed the money into his personal checking account. At the time he did so, some or all of the $2,500.00 remained unearned.
16. The Respondent advised the Loftins that he would petition the court to reopen Carmen Loftin's immigration case.
17. Several months passed and the Complainants heard nothing from the Respondent about the progress of Carmen Loftin's case. Michael Loftin attempted to contact the Respondent on several occasions via telephone and facsimile.
18. The Respondent neglected the case; he did nothing to secure a hearing date for Carmen Loftin, he did not petition the court to reopen her case, he failed to file any of the necessary paperwork with INS, and the Respondent failed to advise the Complainants about the status of the case.
19. On September 9, 1998, the Loftins terminated Respondent's services and Respondent agreed to refund to them the $2,500.00 fee plus $75.00 for interest. Respondent did not thereafter promptly refund said unearned fee to the Loftins.
Based upon the evidence presented and Respondent's stipulation that he violated the following Disciplinary Rules, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence violations of the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 2-108. Terminating Representation.
(D) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take reasonable steps for the continued protection of a client's interest, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of the fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by applicable law.
DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.
(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.
(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.
DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds received or held by a lawyer or law firm on behalf of a client, estate or a ward, residing in this State or from a transaction arising in this State, other than reimbursement of advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts and, as to client funds, maintained at a financial institution in a state in which the lawyer maintains a law office, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay service or other charges or fees imposed by the financial institution may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after they are due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the Bar and the Respondent, the Bar withdrew its contention that Respondent violated DR 2-105(A), DR 6-101(D), and DR 7-101(A)(2).
Based upon the exhibits and testimony presented, the Board finds the allegations that the Respondent violated DR 7-101(A)(1) and DR 7-101(A)(3) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
VSB DOCKET # 99-021-2082 (BREON DAUGHTRY)
20. April 14, 1998, the Respondent was court appointed by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to represent the Complainant, Breon Daughtry (hereinafter Daughtry) on appeal.
21. The Respondent failed to file a petition for appeal with the Court of Appeals of Virginia and on August 7, 1998, the appeal was dismissed on the basis that no petition for appeal had been filed. The language in the order reads inter alia:
"It appearing to the Court that the record in this case was filed in this Court on June 15, 1998; and it further appearing that no petition for appeal has been filed, and that the time allowed by law within which to do so has expired, it is ordered that the case be dismissed, and that the record be returned to the trial court."
22. The Respondent failed to adequately communicate with his client in that he did not advise Daughtry that the appeal had been dismissed by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, he did not respond to status inquires from Daughtry, he did not advise Daughtry of his right to appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, or of the need to note an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court within the 30-day time frame. Nor did the Respondent inform the Complainant that he could seek a writ of habeas corpus.
23. After Daughtry contacted the Court of Appeals of Virginia and learned that his appeal had been dismissed, he wrote Respondent and requested that his file be sent to him so that he could obtain other counsel or proceed pro se. Respondent did not provide the file to Daughtry. However, Daughtry did eventually obtain new counsel who eventually obtained the file.
Based upon the evidence presented and Respondent's stipulation that he violated the following Disciplinary Rules, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence violations of the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:


DR 2-108. Terminating Representation.
(D) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take reasonable steps for the continued protection of a client's interests, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by applicable law.
DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.
(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.
(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the Bar and the Respondent, the Bar withdrew its contention that the Respondent violated DR 2-108(C) and DR 6-101(A).Based upon the evidence and exhibits presented, the Board finds that the allegations that the Respondent violated DR 6-101(D) and DR 7-101(A) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.

VSB DOCKET # 99-022-0319 (JAMES M. LAWSON, JR.)

24. On May 26, 1998, Respondent was appointed to represent Complainant James M. Lawson, Jr. (hereinafter Lawson) on his appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia (an appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals had been filed by Lawson's previous counsel. It was denied).
25. Respondent filed a timely petition on behalf of Lawson to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
26. On August 10, 1998, the Supreme Court refused Lawson's Petition for Appeal.
27. Respondent failed to advise Lawson of the denial of his Petition for Appeal by the Supreme Court.
28. Lawson did not learn about the denial of his appeal until he wrote to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Based on the evidence presented and the stipulations of the parties, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.
(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

Based on the evidence presented, the Board further finds that the alleged violation of DR 6-101(D) was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Board notes that Bar Counsel withdrew the allegation of a violation of DR 6-101(B).

VSB DOCKET # 99-022-2913 (SOPHAN PHITH)

29. In February 1998, Respondent was retained to represent Complainant Sophan Phith (hereinafter Phith) in an immigration matter in which he was subject to the possibility of deportation based on a guilty plea in an unrelated criminal matter.
30. Respondent entered his appearance on behalf of Phith at the bond hearing. Sebok obtained bond for Phith and Phith was thereafter released from custody.
31. In a letter dated May 4, 1998, from the Immigration Court, Respondent was advised that Phith's hearing had been scheduled for June 2, 1998.
32. Sometime thereafter, Respondent timely petitioned the Court for a continuance, which was granted. The matter was continued until September 29, 1998.
33. On September 29, 1998, Immigration Judge Joan V. Churchill entered an order stating "neither the respondent nor the respondent's representative was present" at the removal hearing and therefore, Phith was ordered to be removed from the United States to Cambodia. Any appeal in the matter was due by October 29, 1998.
34. Respondent filed an appeal with INS on December 23, 1998, which was denied on January 14, 1999. Respondent filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. It was dismissed.
35. Respondent failed to communicate with Phith regarding the hearing scheduled for June 2, 1998, and the hearing scheduled for September 29, 1998.
Based upon the evidence presented and the stipulation of the parties as to violations of the following Disciplinary Rules, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 2-108. Terminating Representation.
(D) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take reasonable steps for the continued protection of a client's interests, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by applicable law.
DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.
(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client.
(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

Based on the evidence presented, the Board further finds that the alleged violation of DR 6-101(D) was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Board notes that Bar Counsel withdrew the allegations of violations of DR 2-108(C) and DR 6-101(A).

VSB DOCKET # 00-021-0306 (DONALD HEIDLEBAUGH)

36. Some time between July and October 1996, Respondent was paid $1,500 by Complainant Donald Heidlebaugh (hereinafter Heidlebaugh) to represent Dawn Maureen Egan (hereinafter Egan). Respondent was retained to research Egan's case and see if a Habeas Corpus Petition should be filed.
37. Respondent testified that he was hired to review documents provided by Heidlebaugh, review the court file, attempt to locate the former counsel, a Mr. Dill, whose whereabouts were unknown, and do research to advise whether a habeas corpus petition would be well-founded, that he performed the work for which he was hired, and that in 1997 he informed Heidlebaugh there was no supportable basis for a habeas corpus. The bar offered no evidence to the contrary.
38. Respondent also testified that he kept Heidlebaugh apprised of his efforts in telephone conversations and assumed Heidlebaugh was communicating the information to Egan. The Bar offered no evidence to the contrary and no evidence that Respondent's assumption regarding communication through Heidlebaugh was unreasonable. Respondent did meet with Egan on one occasion and spoke with her by phone on one occasion. Egan was incarcerated at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women in Troy, Virginia, at all relevant times.
39. There was no testimony from Heidlebaugh, in person or by deposition.
40. The Bar's investigator did not review Respondent's file relating to his representation of Egan.
Based on the evidence presented, the Board finds that the alleged violations of DR 2-108(D), DR 6-101(A), (B), (C), and (D), and DR 7-101(A)(1) and (A)(3) have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

VSB DOCKET # 99-022-1480 (BRIAN L. MORRIS)

41. On or around October 3, 1998, Respondent visited Complainant Brian L. Morris (hereinafter Morris) at the Virginia Beach Jail and advised Morris that he would charge $1,500 to represent him in a criminal matter. Morris and Respondent agreed to the Representation.
42. No written retainer agreement, contract or engagement letter was signed.
43. Responded received $1,500 from Ethel Morris (Morris' mother): $750 in cash and a $750 check.
44. Morris became dissatisfied with Respondent's representation and fired him before the preliminary hearing, but after Respondent had appeared on Morris' behalf at more than one bond hearing.
45. The $1,500 that Respondent received from Morris' mother was immediately deposited into his personal bank account, even though at the time he did so, at least a portion of the fee was unearned.
46. Morris requested that Respondent make a partial refund of the $1,500 paid Respondent, which Responded refused to do.
Based upon the evidence presented and Respondent's stipulation that he violated the following Disciplinary Rules, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence violations of the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds received or held by a lawyer or law firm on behalf of a client, estate or a ward, residing in this State or from a transaction arising in this State, other than reimbursement of advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts and, as to client funds, maintained at a financial institution in a state in which the lawyer maintains a law office, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay service or other charges or fees imposed by the financial institution may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, and the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be withdrawn promptly after they are due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
The Board notes that Bar Counsel withdrew the alleged violations of DR 2-105 and DR9-102(B).

VSB DOCKET # 98-022-0677 (MARVIN BERNARD CLEMONS)
47. On November 25, 1996, the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk appointed Respondent to represent Marvin Bernard Clemons (Clemons) in an appeal of a criminal conviction.
48. Respondent filed a petition for appeal with the Virginia Court of Appeals which was denied on June 10, 1997.
49. Respondent did not file an appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court.
50. By letter dated March 7, 1997, Respondent mailed Clemons a copy of the petition for appeal filed with the Virginia Court of Appeals and explained the grounds for appeal.
51. By letter dated June 17, 1997, Respondent mailed Clemons a copy of the Court of Appeals decision and inquired whether Clemons wished to pursue an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court or a habeas corpus petition.
52. There was no evidence presented that Clemons did not in fact receive Respondent's letters, even though they were mailed to a facility where Clemons was no longer lodged. There was no evidence that the correspondence was not forwarded to him at his new facility and no evidence that he did not ultimately receive the correspondence.
Based on the evidence presented, the Board finds that the alleged violations of DR 6-101(B), (C), and (D) have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
VSB DOCKET # 98-022-1502 (BURLEY UZZLE, JR.)


53. On December 5, 1997, the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk appointed Respondent to represent Burley Uzzle, Jr. (hereinafter Uzzle) on an appeal from a Final Order of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk finding Uzzle guilty of violations of the terms of his probation and sentencing him to serve a previously suspended nine-year sentence and a previously suspended twelve-month sentence.
54. Respondent met with Mr. Uzzle and informed him that there were no grounds for an appeal. Mr. Uzzle maintained that he wished to appeal and that he believed his sentence was excessive.
55. Respondent did file a Notice of Appeal on December 15, 1997, and, thereafter, filed a timely petition for appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals.
56. On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals by written order denied the petition for appeal on the merits.
57. On June 25, 1998, Respondent wrote to Mr. Uzzle at the Norfolk City Jail informing him of the Court of Appeals' decision and informing him of his option to file a petition for a habeas corpus or an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
58. Respondent did not verify with Central Records or with the Norfolk City Jail the whereabouts of his client prior to sending him the letter described above even though this letter was written more than six months after Uzzle had been sentenced to a term which almost certainly would be served in a state facility and not in the Norfolk City Jail.
59. Respondent did not file a petition for appeal with he Virginia Supreme Court or a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
60. Respondent's June 25, 1998, letter to Uzzle was addressed to him at the City of Norfolk jail. On February 3, 1998, Uzzle had been transferred from the jail to the Powhatan Correctional Center Receiving Unit, and Uzzle did not receive Respondent's June 25, 1998 letter.
Based on the evidence presented, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.
(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.
Based on the evidence, the Board further finds that the alleged violations of DR 2- 108 (C) and (D) and DR 6-101 (B) and (D) have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Sanctions
Following the conclusion of the Board's findings with respect to violations charged, Bar Counsel and counsel for Respondent were permitted to present evidence in aggravation or in mitigation of the misconduct found by clear and convincing evidence.
Based on the testimony of two clinical psychologists as witnesses for Respondent, the Board is satisfied that, beginning in late 1996 or early 1997, Respondent suffered from clinical depression that produced a personality change and impaired his organizational skills, attention to detail, concentration, and cognition. This is when the incidents of misconduct began and followed several years of practice as a respected and talented lawyer in the areas of criminal appellate work and immigration law. Respondent has been in treatment with a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist since the Spring of 2000 and he remains in treatment pursuant to terms imposed by this Board in an Order entered on November 14, 2000 in connection with six other complaints arising out of conduct which occurred during this same period of time. There has been significant improvement in his condition through psychotherapy and medication since treatment began. From October of 2000 to February of 2001, Respondent attended more than 20 visits with his clinical psychologist and has remained on the medication prescribed for him by the treating psychiatrist.
In its consideration of Respondent's diagnosed depression, the Board was mindful of Part Six, Section IV, paragraph 13C(6)(e) of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
If the Board finds that the Misconduct was the result of a Disability, it may consider the Disability in mitigation of any discipline imposed.
The Board also considered evidence from character witnesses as well as the testimony of Respondent. The Board is satisfied that before the onset of his depression, Respondent was uniformly respected as an able, talented lawyer who zealously advocated for his clients. The Board is satisfied, too, that Respondent is remorseful and recognizes the harm caused his clients, and that Respondent is committed to remain in a psychotherapy and medication program to restore his mental health. The Board notes the testimony of the chair of the Tidewater Committee on Lawyers Helping Lawyers that Respondent suggested to him a need for a program to assist lawyers coping with depression.
According to the testimony of Steven Waranch, Respondent's clinical psychologist, since September of 2000 Respondent's depression has improved on a normal curve, and his symptoms of depression have been lessened. He believes he will continue to improve with psychotherapy and medication.
Based on the evidence, the Board finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's misconduct was the result of a disability and considers the disability in mitigation of the discipline imposed.
WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED that Andrew Robert Sebok's license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia be and hereby is suspended for a period of ten (10) months effective February 23, 2001.
It is further ORDERED that pursuant to the provisions of Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13.K(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Andrew Robert Sebok shall forthwith give notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the suspension of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, to all clients for whom he is currently handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and presiding judges in pending litigation. He shall also make appropriate arrangements for the disposition of matters then in his care in conformity with the wishes of his clients. He shall give such notice with fourteen (14) days of the effective date of the Suspension Order, and make such arrangements as are required herein within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the Suspension Order. He shall furnish proof to the Bar within sixty (60) days of the effective date of the Suspension Order that such notices have been timely given and such arrangement for the disposition of matters made. Issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and arrangements required herein shall be determined by the Disciplinary Board, which may impose a sanction of revocation or suspension for failure to comply with the requirements of this subparagraph.
It is further ORDERED that Andrew Robert Sebok shall furnish true copies of the notice letters sent to all persons notified of the suspension with the original return receipts for said notice letters to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System.
Pursuant to Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13.K(10) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess costs. It is further ORDERED that a copy teste of this Order shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Respondent at his last address of record with the Virginia State Bar, 154 Newtown Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23462; to his counsel of record, James C. Roberts, Esquire, Troutman, Sanders, Mays & Valentine, LLP, 1111 East Main Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219; and hand-delivered to Charlotte P. Hodges, Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, 707 East Main Street, Suite 1500, Richmond, Virginia 23219.
ENTERED this ___ day of _________, 2001.
VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD
By:_______________________________________
William M. Moffet, First Vice Chair